Labor and Comparative Corporate Governance in Times of Pension Capitalism.  Independent Directors, Shareholder Empowerment and Long-Termism: the Transatlantic Perspective by Roth, Dr. Markus
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 18, Number 4 2013 Article 1
Labor and Comparative Corporate Governance
in Times of Pension Capitalism. Independent
Directors, Shareholder Empowerment and
Long-Termism: the Transatlantic Perspective
Dr. Markus Roth∗
∗
Copyright c©2013 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
VOLUME XVIII 2013 NUMBER 4 
 
FORDHAM 
JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LABOR AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
TIMES OF PENSION CAPITALISM 
 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT 
AND LONG-TERMISM: THE TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Dr. Markus Roth 
 
  751
LABOR AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN TIMES OF PENSION 
CAPITALISM 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDER 
EMPOWERMENT AND LONG-TERMISM: THE 
TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Markus Roth* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 753 
I.  LABOR AND PENSIONS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FIRM IN 
THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ............................................... 758 
A. LABOR IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES......................... 758 
1. Industrial Relations in Germany and the United States .... 758 
2. Employee Participation via Board Representatives in 
Germany .......................................................................... 759 
3. Shifting Demographics: Participation of Older People 
and Women in the Labor Market ..................................... 762 
4. Introduction of a 40% Quota with (Quasi-) Parity Co-
determination? ................................................................. 764 
B. PENSION SYSTEM IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES ......... 770 
1. The German Focus on State Pensions and Life 
Insurance ......................................................................... 770 
2. Employee participation Via Private Pensions in the 
United States .................................................................... 771 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Marburg, Chair for Private Law, Labour Law, 
German and European Commercial and Business Law; Senior research fellow, Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg (2002–08); 
Visiting fellow, University of Cambridge, 2008.  This article is based on lectures at the 
University of Kyoto and Fordham University School of Law (Eugene P. and Delia S. 
Murphy Conference on Corporate Law, 2012) and in parts on a German article in the 
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftrecht, 40 ZGR 516 (2011).  I thank the 
participants of the conferences for their helpful comments, Martin Wilhelm for 
translation and language revision, and the team of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law. 
752 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
3. Occupational Pensions in Germany .................................. 772 
4. Corporate Finance and the Trend from Defined Benefits 
to Defined Contributions ................................................. 774 
C. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ................................... 775 
1. The Rise of Institutional Investors in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom .............................................. 775 
2. Institutional Investors and Foreign Shareholdings ........... 777 
3. Occupational Pensions and Foreign Shareholdings in 
Germany .......................................................................... 778 
D. PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ..................... 780 
1. The Influence of Institutional Shareholders on US and 
UK Corporate Governance .............................................. 780 
2. The European Code of Conduct Movement ....................... 781 
E. THEORY OF THE FIRM ................................................................ 782 
1. The Shareholder Value Puzzle ........................................... 782 
2. Pensions Bridging the Rift Between Shareholder Value 
and the Stakeholder Approach ......................................... 783 
3. The European Company .................................................... 785 
II.  INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR PARADIGM AND BOARD 
COMMITTEES ............................................................................... 787 
A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN THE US, EUROPE AND ASIA ......... 787 
1. The Rise of Independent Boards ........................................ 787 
2. Independent Chairpersons and Committees ...................... 791 
B. INDEPENDENCE AND EXPERTISE ................................................ 793 
C. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN GERMANY ................................... 794 
D. INDEPENDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CO-DETERMINATION 
AND THE TWO-TIER STRUCTURE? ........................................... 797 
1. Independent Directors in Co-Determined Boards ............. 797 
2. Establishing Two-Tier Boards or Co-Determination in 
the US?............................................................................. 799 
III.  BALANCING DIRECTOR PRIMACY AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS . 800 
A. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS ........................ 800 
1. Shareholder Empowerment in the US ................................ 800 
2. Stewardship Codes ............................................................. 801 
B. THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IN THE GERMAN STOCK 
CORPORATION ACT 1937 ........................................................ 803 
C. PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING ENLIGHTENED DIRECTOR 
PRIMACY ................................................................................. 807 
1. Shareholders Directly Contacting Independent 
Directors .......................................................................... 807 
2. Director Accountability and Adequate Compensation ...... 807 
IV.  LONG-TERMISM ........................................................................... 808 
A. LONG-TERMISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION ............... 808 
2013] PENSION CAPITALISM 753 
1. Long-Termism in the European Commission Green 
Paper on Corporate Governance .................................... 808 
2. Changing Pension Design? ................................................ 810 
B. GERMAN LONG-TERMISM COMPANY LAW PRINCIPLES ............. 812 
1. Adequate Management Compensation............................... 812 
2. Annual Discharge of Managing and Supervisory 
Directors .......................................................................... 814 
3. Deductibles in D&O Insurance.......................................... 815 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES (ESG), 
ESPECIALLY GREEN INVESTMENT ........................................... 817 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK ............................................................... 819 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Correctly understood, the effects of labor and pensions are not only 
central to the corporate governance debate; as the United States, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland show, pension systems 
largely make up capital markets.1  Other continental European countries, 
such as Germany and Austria, illustrate that a lack of significant pension 
assets corresponds with a lack of deep capital markets.  While pension 
assets in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands exceed their gross domestic product (“GDP”), occupational 
pension assets account for less than a quarter of GDP in Germany and 
Austria.2  Germany and Austria provide for quasi-parity or third-parity 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Markus Roth, Private Altersvorsorge als Aspekt der Corporate Governance, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 516, 527 (2011) 
(Ger.) [hereinafter Roth, Private Altersvorsorge 2011]. 
 2. See TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSETS STUDY 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/ 
Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2013 (finding the following ratios of pension assets to 
GDP: Netherlands 156%, Switzerland 118%, United Kingdom 112%, United States 
108%, Germany 15%).  The ratio of private pension assets, including individual 
(private or personal) pension assets, is higher than the ratio of occupational pensions to 
GDP.  See OECD PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 44 fig.1.2, 61 fig.2.5 (2008): 
Netherlands 149.1 versus 132.2%, Switzerland 151.9 versus 119.4%, United Kingdom 
96.4 versus 86.1%, United States 124.0 versus 74.3%, Austria 18.8 versus 4.7%, 
Germany 17.9 versus 4.1% (data for 2007); for more recent data for occupational 
pensions, see OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011 173 (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd—ilibrary.org/docserver/download/8111011e.pdf? 
expires=1359327528&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A3F306006CF6843EB837A
73326C37B31 (a higher ratio of pension assets to GDP exists when individual 
(personal) pensions are included). 
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board-level co-determination of employees,3 which is unknown to the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland, and not mandatory 
for international holding companies in the Netherlands.4  Although the 
Netherlands does provide for third-parity co-determination for national 
companies, international holding companies like EADS, the parent 
company of Airbus, are co-determination free. 
Reflecting the great importance of occupational pensions and 
public pension funds in the United States, Peter Drucker popularized the 
phrase “pension-fund socialism” shortly after the introduction of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in the 1970s.5  
This concept captures the overwhelming importance of the pension fund 
industry in the U.S., and of employees as ultimate beneficiaries.6  In the 
United Kingdom, the term “pension-fund capitalism” was coined at the 
height of the stock market around the new millennium.7  Until then, 
countries that lacked, or had only a minor presence of, occupational 
pensions tended to have a blockholder corporate governance system, 
while dispersed ownership was the common form in countries focused 
on occupational pensions.8  The ownership structure has evolved, at 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Codetermination in Europe, 6 J. COMP. BUS. & 
CAPITAL MARKET L. 203, 216–22 (1984). 
 4. Markus Roth, Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm: A 
Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination, 11 EUR. 
BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 51, 70–72 (2010) [hereinafter Roth, Employee 
Participation]. 
 5. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND 
SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 68 (1976); see also William H. Simon, The Prospects of 
Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (1993) (noting that 
Drucker popularized the term). 
 6. See DRUCKER, supra note 5 at 1 (Through their pension funds, employees of 
American business today own at least 25% of its equity capital; pension funds of the 
self-employed, of the public employees, and of school and college teachers own at least 
another 10%.). 
 7. GORDON L. CLARK, PENSION FUND CAPITALISM (2000).  Focusing on defined 
benefit schemes, DAVID BLAKE, PENSION SCHEMES AND PENSION FUNDS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 575 (2d ed. 2003), stated that in 2000, through their pension funds, 
companies in Britain owned about one-third of one another.  For a comprehensive 
analysis of the evolution of the British Corporate Govenance System from a company 
law perspective, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: 
BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED (2008). 
 8. For an early comparison of the United States and Germany, see Richard M. 
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 
57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991), and Friedrich K. Kübler, Institutional Owners and 
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least in Germany, leaving many blue chips in dispersed ownership and 
most with a majority of foreign shareholders.9  In a separate worldwide 
trend, occupational pension schemes changed from defined benefits 
(“DB”) to defined contributions (“DC”), thereby shifting the investment 
risk from the employers to employees, and investment from pension 
funds to investment companies.10  Therefore, the term “pension 
capitalism” is more accurate and will be used in this contribution on 
comparative corporate governance from the transatlantic perspective. 
Different levels of reliance on occupational pensions correlate with 
total market capitalization of the respective countries and, inter alia, 
different funding levels of financial supervisory agencies.11  This 
correlation is more significant than the civil law/common law country 
explanation.12  The importance of private pension assets may better 
explain such differences than investor protection as measured by La 
Porta et al.13  This approach has been criticized for failing to consider all 
relevant mechanisms of investor protection.14  The shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97 (1991).  Since the 
United States and United Kingdom pension funds shifted their investment strategy 
towards foreign equity, institutional investors are now the most important class of 
investors in countries with a minor presence of private pensions. 
 9. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 10. At the end of 2011, a majority of pension assets were in the form of DC plans 
in the United States, Australia and Switzerland, (57%, 81% and 60%, respectively). See 
TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSETS STUDY 36–37 (2012), available at 
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2012/01/ 
Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2012.  Data in the following study is slightly revised and 
Switzerland is excluded for the peculiarity of the Swiss occupational pension system. In 
the seven most important markets, DC assets rose to 43% in 2011 from 38% in 2001.  
Also, in countries where DC was of minor importance or even non-existent in 2001, DC 
assets rose: in Canada from 3% to 4%, in Japan from 0% to 2%, and in the Netherlands 
from 2% to 7%.  The most significant increase was in the United Kingdom, from 8% to 
39% (In 2012, the level stood at 26%). 
 11. Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 56–58. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of 
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009).  For a review 
of La Porta et al. investor protection categories, see La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 
106 J. POL. ECON. NO. 6. 1113, 1122–25 (1998).  
 14. John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence From a Cross-
Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 579, 611 (2009) (showing weaker shareholder protection from the board and other 
shareholders in the United States than in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and 
India). 
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empowerment debate in the United States highlights this critique.15  In 
continental Europe, nominating directors is a common mechanism for 
investor protection.16  This mechanism is now available in the United 
States as well—it is procedurually and economically feasible—with 
pension funds having played a critical role in the political process.17  
Interestingly, the United States played a central role in implementing 
director primacy in German corporate governance.18  However, director 
primacy has not gone so far as to exclude shareholders from nominating 
directors.19 
Besides the balance of shareholder rights and director primacy in 
corporate governance, this article focuses on independent directors and 
long-termism in times of pension capitalism.  The independent director 
paradigm was the first principle promoted by the Council of Institutional 
Investors (“CII”), and was later accepted.20  On its website, CII stresses 
that shareholders in the 1980s “had little say in most corporate 
decisions,”21 suggesting that CII promoted and successfully launched 
shareholder empowerment.  Independent directors and shareholder 
empowerment are linked insofar as director accountability is provided 
by independent directors that, inter alia, are channels for expressing 
concerns.22 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 188 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 847 (2005) (pointing to the United Kingdom); see also Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–85 (2006) 
(replying to Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a 
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for 
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006)). 
 16. Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States 
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 745–46 
(2005). 
 17. For the Dodd-Frank Act, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1089, last amended by the German Restructuring Act 
(Restrukturierungsgesetz), Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, art. 6 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-2010-english-
translation-pdf-59656.pdf (explicitly providing for such a nomination right). 
 20. See Markus Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS 
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 605, 611 (2011) (Ger.).   
 21. See About Us, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (CII), 
http://www.cii.org/about_us (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 22. See infra Part II. 
2013] PENSION CAPITALISM 757 
A third main feature of corporate governance principles promoted 
by both pension funds and pension fund associations is long-termism.23  
This principle is not yet established.  As the European Commission 
highlighted in a recent Green Paper on corporate governance, pension 
money does not lead to long-term investment.24  Long-termism is 
nevertheless promoted in some company law principles, such as the 
discharge of directors (backing of director actions) instead of mandatory 
reelection, thereby incentivizing long-term strategies.25  Remuneration 
in Germany is also now linked to the sustainable development of the 
company.26  An issue that is yet to be discussed is whether different 
levels and methods of pension funding contributed to global imbalances, 
a matter of growing concern since the financial crisis.  Due to 
international diversification of assets and short-termism of asset 
managers, sustainable development might be hindered; a detailed 
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this contribution. 
Part I of the article begins by discussing labor and pensions as 
determinants of the firm in a comparative perspective.  While in the 
United States and the United Kingdom labor plays a minor role in the 
corporate governance of firms, in continental Europe co-determination 
is not restricted to pension funds such as Hermes Fund Managers (UK) 
or Californian Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”) 
(US).27  Moreover, while strict quotas for women on boards have been 
implemented in some countries such as Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and France, the UK Corporate Governance Code introduces a more 
flexible model.28  Other corporate governance principles correlate with 
the rise of institutional investors; these investors are largely based in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, but relevant in most 
industrialized countries.29  Parts II and III of this article address the 
already implemented features, such as independent directors and 
shareholder empowerment.  These principles continue to spread 
worldwide due to investments abroad; according to the US Treasury, US 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. European Commission, Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance 
Framework, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
 25. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 26. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 27. Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 70–75. 
 28. See infra Part I.A.3–4. 
 29. For an early description, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 863 (1991). 
758 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
portfolio holdings account for more than 10% of market capitalization in 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and France; up to 19% in the United 
Kingdom; and 26% in Switzerland.30  Like long-termism, the core 
corporate governance feature which is yet to be established—
independence and the balancing of shareholder rights with director 
primacy—will be discussed in Part IV.  This feature will be assessed in 
the global perspective, taking into account country-specific peculiarities. 
I. LABOR AND PENSIONS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FIRM IN THE 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A. LABOR IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 
1. Industrial Relations in Germany and the United States 
Protection against dismissals is a central feature of German labor 
law.31  In plants with more than ten employees and for employment 
contracts lasting at least six months, dismissals require good cause and 
are subject to judicial review.32  By contrast, the United States is one of 
the very few countries still subscribing to the employment-at-will 
doctrine; restrictions concerning dismissal must be incorporated into the 
employment contract.33  However, “business affairs” are considered 
good cause for dismissals in Germany.  Business judgment was first 
                                                                                                                 
 30. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., REPORT ON U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF 
FOREIGN SECURITIES: AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 12 tbl.7 (2011) [hereinafter 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx. 
 31. The legal basis is the Kündigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Protection Against 
Dismissal Act], Aug. 10, 1951, BGBL. I at 1317, as amended (Ger.); see generally 
ULRICH PREIS, PRINZIPIEN DES KÜNDIGUNGSRECHTS BEI ARBEITSVERHÄLTNISSEN 
(1987). 
 32. Protection Against Dismissal Act §§ 1, 23.  If employment contracts were in 
force before January 1, 2004, a plant with more than five employees would be subject 
to the rule. Id. § 23(2). 
 33. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 671–72 (Hornbook Series 2d 
ed. 1999). 
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introduced in Germany in this context,34 and only in 2005 was the 
German business judgment rule adopted for director liability.35 
In Germany, collective bargaining is performed, in principle, 
industry-wide.36  This reflects the business structure in Germany, which 
relies heavily on the concept of “Mittelstand” (small and medium 
family-owned firms), as well as on large family-owned firms.37  Large 
enterprises in particular, such as Volkswagen (“VW”), have enterprise-
specific collective agreements.  International studies show a correlation 
between industry-wide collective bargaining and board-level co-
determination.38 
2. Employee Participation via Board Representatives in Germany 
In Germany, a unique system of employee co-determination on 
boards prevails.39  Stock corporations employing more than 2,000 within 
Germany are subject to quasi-parity co-determination,40 while those 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Markus Roth, Die betriebsbedingte Kündigung zwischen freier 
Unternehmerentscheidung und Arbeitnehmerschutz, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1845, 1849 (2009) (Ger.). 
 35. Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR § 93 Abs. 
1 Satz 2 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 2005) (Ger.); Markus Roth, 
Outside Director Liability: German Stock Corporation Law in Transatlantic 
Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 337 (2008) (U.K.) [hereinafter Roth, Outside Director 
Liability]. 
 36. For data, see Peter Ellguth & Susanne Kohaut, Tarifbindung und betriebliche 
Interessenvertretung—aktuelle Ergebnisse aus dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2009, 63 WSI-
MITTEILUNGEN 204 (2010).  For recent trends towards enterprise-specific collective 
agreements and flexibility, see WOLF DIETER HEINBACH, TARIFBINDUNG, 
LOHNSTRUKTUR UND TARIFVERTRAGLICHE FLEXIBILISIERUNGSPOTENZIALE (2009). 
 37. Even among the hundred largest German enterprises, only in twenty-one are 
the majority of shares in dispersed ownership. German Monopolies Commission, 
Neunzehntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission 2010/2011, German 
Parliamentary Papers 17/10365, at 165, ¶ 326. 
 38. See Gregory Jackson, Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A 
Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, Unionism and Political Institutions, 12 
INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 252 (2005). 
 39. Markus Roth, Die unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der monistischen SE, 
35 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [ZfA] 431, 432 (2004) (Ger.). 
 40. Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer [Mitbestimmungsgesetz] 
[Act on Co-determination by Employees (Co-Determination Act)], May 4, 1976, 
BGBL. I at 1153, last amended by the Act, Mar. 23 2002, BGBL. I at 1130 (Ger.), 
available at http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/__Archiv/labour-law/act-on-
co-determination-by-employees. 
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employing more than 500 are subject to third-parity co-determination.41  
For the coal, steel, and mining industries, a special parity co-
determination regime was introduced shortly after World War II,42 
laying the foundation for post-war employee participation at the board 
level.43   The British government of the German industrial heartland of 
Rhein/Ruhr established employee representation in part as an insurance 
device against the re-militarization of Germany.44  Therefore, the 
political dimension of co-determination is key;45 the same is true for the 
objectives of progress in European company law.46 
For German stock corporations, three models of employee 
representation can be distinguished: third-parity co-determination, 
introduced in 1952,47 and now under the One-Third Participation Act in 
companies with more than 500 employees;48 quasi-parity co-
determination under the Co-Determination Act of 1976 with a decisive 
vote of the supervisory board’s chairman in companies with more than 
2,000 employees;49 and parity composition of the board with an 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat 
[Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz] [One-Third Participation Act], May 18, 2004, BGBL. I at 
974 (Ger.). 
 42. Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und 
Vorständen der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden 
Industrie [Co-Determination Act for the Coal, Steel and Mining Industry], May 21, 
1951, BGBL. I at 347 (Ger.). 
 43. For the development of German board-level co-determination, see Hartmut 
Oetker, Vorbemerkung zur Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat 
[Foreword on Co-Determination], in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR COMMENT NO. 
12 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 1999) (Ger.). 
 44. Roth, Die unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der monistischen SE, supra 
note 39, at 432–33. 
 45. See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003). 
 46. For an example of the political dimension in European private company law, 
see Jan Bremer, Kompromissvorschlag zur Europäischen Privatgesellschaft (EPG) 
vorgelegt, 2011 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 695 (discussing 
a proposal for compromise regarding the Societas Privata Europaea (a European statute 
for close corporations)). 
47 Introduced in 1952 as part of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works 
Council Constitution Act], Oct. 11, 1952, BGBL I at 681 (Ger.). 
 48. Section 1 (1) One-Third Participation Act, May 18, 2004, BGBL. I at 974 
(Ger.). 
 49. See Co-Determination Act, May 4, 1976, BGBL. I at 1153, last amended by the 
Act, Mar. 23 2002, BGBL. I at 1130, § 29(2) (Ger.).  The chairman is typically a 
shareholder representative. See Co-Determination Act § 27(1)–(2). 
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independent member pursuant to the special co-determination regime in 
the coal, steel and mining industries.50  The German co-determination 
system allows only for the representation of workers employed in 
Germany,51 which is strongly criticized.52  Supervisory board employee 
representatives are required not only on the supervisory boards of 
companies which themselves employ more than 500 employees, but also 
on those of companies incorporated as stock corporations or limited 
liability companies with subsidiaries employing more than 500 
employees.53  In 2009, about 1,500 companies (695 stock corporations) 
were subject to third-parity co-determination54 and about 700 companies 
(280 stock corporations) were subject to quasi-parity co-determination.55  
Thus, about 1,000 stock corporations in Germany are subject to co-
determination. 
Recent studies on the legal regimes in France and Portugal show 
significant effects from basing labor protection on productivity and firm 
                                                                                                                 
 50. In 2002, 45 companies reported having such a structure. See Klaus J. Hopt & 
Markus Roth, in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, § 96, ¶ 13. 
 51. For a reform proposal, see G. Bachmann, T. Baums, M. Habersack, 
M. Henssler, M. Lutter, H. Oetker and P. Ulmer, Entwurf einer Regelung zur Mitbe-
stimmungsvereinbarung sowie zur Größe des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats (Arbeitskreis 
Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung), 30 ZIP 885 (2009). 
 52. NICO RAABE, DIE MITBESTIMMUNG IM AUFSICHTSRAT: THEORIE UND 
WIRKLICHKEIT IN DEUTSCHEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN 333 (2011); Hans-Jürgen 
Hellwig & Caspar Behme, Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Probleme der deutschen 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung, 54 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 261 (2009); Hans-
Jürgen Hellwig & Caspar Behme, Zur Einbeziehung ausländischer Belegschaften in die 
deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf des Arbeitskreises 
“Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung”, 30 ZIP 1791 (2009); Hans-Jürgen Hellwig & 
Caspar Behme, Gemeinschaftsrechtswidrigkeit und Anwendungsvorrang des 
Gemeinschaftsrechts in der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung, 31 ZIP 871 
(2010); Volker Rieble & Clemens Latzel, Inlandsmitbestimmung als 
Ausländerdiskriminierung bei Standortkonflikten, 4 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
ARBEITSRECHT [EuZA] 145 (2011).  Many German companies are reincorporating as 
European companies to bypass this regime. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra 
note 4, at 72. 
 53. One-Third Participation Act § 2 (more than 500 employees); Co-Determination 
Act § 5 (more than 2000 employees). 
 54. Walter Bayer & Thomas Hoffmann, AG-Report: Aktienrecht in Zahlen, 
Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat, in SONDERTEIL DER ZEITSCHRIFT 
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 151, 153 (2010). 
 55. Statistiken zur Mitbestimmungslandschaft, HANS-BÖCKLER-STIFTUNG, 
http://www.boeckler.de/38347.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
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size.56  The effects of co-determination on the legal form chosen by 
companies have become apparent with hindsight: after limiting 
mandatory co-determination for newly-founded stock corporations to 
companies with more than 500 employees in 1994, the number of 
registered stock corporations in Germany rose from under 3,000 to 
about 17,000.57  According to the statistics of labor representatives, the 
number of stock corporations, as well as the overall number of 
companies subject to quasi-parity co-determination, is in decline.58 
3. Shifting Demographics: Participation of Older People and Women in 
the Labor Market 
Globally, the first wave of the so-called “baby boomers” is retiring, 
and in many countries birth rates are lower than needed for the 
replication of age cohorts.59  Due to greater life expectancy and lower 
fertility, demographics are shifting in Germany even more than in the 
United States, though they may be more heavily discussed in the latter.60  
Life expectancy grew more or less linearly in prior decades, leading to 
added years in retirement, even considering prospected rises in pension 
age.61  To counteract the surge of public debt without further reforms,62 
state pensions designed as pay-as-you-go schemes in Germany, as well 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, Firm Size Distortions and 
the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France (London Sch. Of Econ., Ctr. of 
Econ. Performance, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1128, 2012); Serguey Braguinsky, Lee 
G. Branstetter & Andre Regateiro, The Incredible Shrinking Portuguese Firm (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,265, 2011). 
 57. Walter Bayer & Thomas Hoffmann, AG-Report: Aktienrecht in Zahlen, 
Statistiken zur AG – eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme, in SONDERTEIL DER ZEITSCHRIFT 
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 283, 286 (2010) (finding 16,998 registered stock corporations 
in Germany as of June 1, 2010).  At the end of 1993, 3,085 stock corporations were 
reported. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Kapitalmarktstatistik, März 2012, available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Veroeffentlichungen/Statistische
_Beihefte_2/2012/2012_03_kapitalmarktstatistik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
 58. See HANS-BÖCKLER-STIFTUNG, www.boeckler.de. 
 59. OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: 2011, supra note 2. 
 60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995); LAWRENCE A. 
FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2010). 
 61. OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2011, supra note 2, at 34. 
 62. STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL AGING 2010: AN IRREVERSIBLE TRUTH 33 tbl.3 
(2010), available at http://www.apapr.ro/images/stories/materiale/COMUNICATE/ 
2010/2010%2031%20attach.pdf (estimated German net government debt as a 
percentage of GDP of 400% in 2050). 
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as slightly improving birth rates for women born in 1969 or later63—and 
expected by the United Nations64—are of great importance.  The 
European Commission responded by launching Europe 2020,65 which 
aims to improve participation of women and older people in the labor 
market.66  Both participation rates have already risen; in particular, there 
might be a correlation between the participation rates of women and 
early steps of legislation concerning the right to work part-time67 and the 
provision of paternity leave.68 
The much-discussed female quota in boardrooms, a central feature 
in European corporate governance,69 should be viewed against this 
backdrop.  European Commissioner Viviane Reding regularly 
announces a quota as part of the Agenda 2020.  In 2004, Norway 
imposed a quota of 40% for women on boards, with others such as Spain 
and France following suit.70  The glass ceiling is well documented in 
U.S. economic and social literature,71 but neither the United States nor 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Joshua R. Goldstein & Michaela Kreyenfeld, Has East Germany Overtaken 
West Germany? Recent Trends in Order-Specific Fertility, 37 POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 453, 464 (2011). 
 64. OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: 2011, supra note 2, at 163 (expecting fertility 
rate to increase to 1.69 in 2045-2050 from 1.32 in 2005-2010).  For fertility rates from 
1960 to 2010, determined based on a tempo-adjusted method, see Marc Luy, Tempo 
Effects and their Relevance in Demographic Analysis, 35 COMP. POPULATION STUD. 
415, 431 (2010); Marc Luy & Olga Pötzsch, Estimates of the Tempo-adjusted Total 
Fertility Rate in Western and Eastern Germany, 1955–2008, 35 COMP. POPULATION 
STUDIES 605, 621 (2010) (finding a tempo-adjusted total fertility rate of 1.65 in 2007). 
 65. See Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020 – A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 5, 2010). 
 66. Id. at 10 (“The employment rate of the population aged 20-64 should increase 
from the current 69% to at least 75%, including through the greater involvement of 
women, older workers and the better integration of migrants in the work force.”). 
 67. Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz [TzBfG] [Part-Time and Fixed-Term 
Employment Act], Dec. 21, 2000, BGBL. I at 1966, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 
20, 2011, BGBL. I at 2854 (Ger.). 
 68. Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz [BEEG] [Federal Parental Allowance 
and Parental Leave Act], Dec. 5, 2006, BGBL. I at 2748, last amended by G, Sept. 10, 
2012, BGBL. I at 1878 (Ger.). 
 69. See Katja Langenbucher, Zentrale Akteure der Corporate Governance: 
Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats, Zum Vorschlag einer obligatorischen 
Besetzungserklärung, ZGR 314, 322 (2012) (Ger.). 
 70. For an early discussion of the reform movement, see Poonam Puri, The Future 
of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance 48 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 427, 442 
(2010).  In France, the quota of 40% has to be fulfilled by companies in 2017. 
 71. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL 
USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995), available at 
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the United Kingdom has imposed a binding quota.  In the United States, 
the SEC has called for policy statements from issuers.72  Meanwhile, in 
the United Kingdom, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code will be 
amended in 2012 to require a special section on diversity in a company’s 
Annual Report.73  Early U.S. studies showed positive results for diverse 
boards,74 and recent economic literature suggests that radical gender 
shifts in the composition of boards can cause financial harm to 
companies without women on their boards.75 
4. Introduction of a 40% Quota with (Quasi-) Parity Co-determination? 
Diversity is currently the hottest debate in German corporate 
governance.76  In its response to the Report of the Government 
Commission on German Corporate Governance, the government 
                                                                                                                 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=key_w
orkplace. 
 72. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, 
Exchange Act Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74 
Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,364 (Dec. 16, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § § 229.407 (2012)) 
(disclosure on diversity, strategy and implementation by the nomination committee). 
 73. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, FEEDBACK STATEMENT: GENDER DIVERSITY ON 
BOARDS 5 (2011) (announcing to amend provision B.2.4 of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code in 2012 as follows (in italics): “A separate section of the annual 
report should describe the work of the nomination committee, including the process it 
has used in relation to board appointments.  This section should include a description of 
the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has 
set for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives.  An 
explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open 
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a nonexecutive 
director.”). 
 74. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm 
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003). 
 75. For Norway: Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the 
Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 
127 Q. J. ECON. 137 (2012). 
 76. Gregor Bachmann, Zur Umsetzung einer Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat, 32 ZIP 
1131 (2011); Langenbucher, supra note 69; Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Zur 
Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat, 31 ZIP 660 (2010); Claudia Schubert & Gönke Jacobsen, 
Personelle Vielfalt als Element guter Unternehmensführung - die Empfehlung des 
Corporate Governance Kodex und die Rechtsfolgen ihrer unzureichenden 
Berücksichtigung, 2-3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND BANKRECHT  [WM] 726 
(2011); Daniela Weber-Rey & Friederike Handt, Vielfalt/Diversity im Kodex - 
Selbstverpflichtung, Bemühenspflicht und Transparenz, NZG 1 (2011). 
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stressed that politicians expect improvement in the participation of 
women in supervisory and management boards.77  However, the way in 
which stronger participation of women in the boardroom should be 
implemented is not yet clear.  Leading German company directors, 
politicians, and even the government are split over the question of 
whether a legal rule, as in Norway, the Netherlands, and France, should 
be enacted.78  Some commentators have questioned whether the 
Corporate Governance Commission had a mandate to include diversity 
in the German Code,79 and whether a legal quorum for women would be 
in line with the German Constitution80 and the European anti-
discrimination rules.81 
For a better understanding of the German discussion on diversity, 
one needs to consider that the German supervisory board is already 
highly politicized.82  Taking into account quasi-mandatory co-
determination in big companies, implementing a 40% quota, as 
advocated by the Green Party,83 Social Democratic Party,84 and in 
September 201285 by the upper house of the German parliament 
                                                                                                                 
 77. STELLUNGNAHME DER BUNDESREGIERUNG ZUM BERICHT DER 
REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [OPINION OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ON 
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 1 (2010). 
 78. For discussion, see Katja Langenbucher, Frauenquote und Gesellschaftsrecht, 
66 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1038 (2011). 
 79. Peter O. Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, Grundfragen des Deutschen 
Corporate Governance Kodex und der Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG,  176 
ZHR 286, 321–23 (2012). 
 80. Gerald Spindler & Kathrin Brandt, Verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit einer 
Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat der börsennotierten AG, 2011 NZG 401, 404–05; 
more flexible in this regard is Hans-Jürgen Papier & Martin Heidebach, Die Einführung 
einer gesetzlichen Frauenquote für die Aufsichtsräte deutscher Unternehmen unter 
verfassungsrechtlichen Aspekten, 2011 ZGR 305. 
 81. Jobst-Hubertus Bauer, Gesetzliche Quote: Verfassungsrechtlich kaum haltbar!, 
BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] I (2001:48); more flexible in this regard is Kathrin Brandt & 
Alexander Thiele, Zulässigkeit einer Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat unter 
Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des EuGH, 2011 AG 580. 
 82. For co-determination, see ROE, supra note 45, at 29–37; see also id. at 71–82 
(country analysis). 
 83. Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 17/3296 (Ger.). 
 84. SPD-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung der Chancengleichheit von 
Männern und Frauen in Wirtschaftsunternehmen (ChGlFöG) [Equal Opportunities 
Draft Bill of the Social Democratic Party],  BT 17/8878 (Ger.). 
 85. For further developments in 2013, see infra text accompanying note 112. 
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(Bundesrat),86 would only allow shareholders to freely choose three out 
of ten directors.  This might explain why the industry took the German 
Corporate Governance Code itself off the agenda—to hinder future 
action.87  Even if a repeal of the German Corporate Governance Code 
was highly unlikely due to this industry pressure, 2011 was the second 
year since the German Corporate Governance Code’s 2002 enactment in 
which it was not amended.  However, a broad discussion of a quota for 
women on boards switched to a discussion of introducing a legal quota.  
On the basis of a report by Mathias Habersack on state and parastatal 
interventions in corporate governance (“Habersack Report”),88 the 
German Jurist Forum recommended an evaluation of experiences in 
other European countries, but not an introduction of a legal (binding or 
flexible) quota for German boards.89 
While the German discussion has largely neglected European 
initiatives,90 issues such as shortcomings in the compatibility of family 
life with a woman’s career, as well as better conditions in neighboring 
countries, have been stressed.91  Empirical research shows a correlation 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von Frauen 
und Männern in Führungsgremien (GlTeilhG) [Promotion of Gender Equality in 
Management Bodies], BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 330/12 (Beschluss). 
 87. Kremer, who comments on the Code, see HENRIK-MICHAEL RINGLEB, THOMAS 
KREMER, MARCUS LUTTER & AXEL V. WERDER, KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX (4th ed. 2010), and published an article on the Code, 
see Thomas Kremer, Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex auf dem Prüfstand: 
bewährte Selbst- oder freiwillige Überregulierung?, 32 ZIP 1177 (2011), is chief 
compliance officer of ThyssenKrupp. 
 88. MATHIAS HABERSACK, STAATLICHE UND HALBSTAATLICHE EINGRIFFE IN DIE 
UNTERNEHMENSFÜHRUNG, GUTACHTEN E ZUM 69. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG, MÜNCHEN 
34–43 (2012). 
 89. 69. DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG MÜNCHEN 2012: BESCHLÜSSE [69TH GERMAN 
JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012: DECISIONS], Abteilung Wirtschaftsrecht [Business Law 
Section], Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung, 
Resolution I.3, at 17 (Ger.) [hereinafter GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012]. 
 90. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 6–7 (concerning strategy for equality 
between women and men); Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, at 7, COM (2010) 0491 final (Sept. 21, 2010) (concerning 
initiatives to improve gender balance in decision-making); see also the comparative 
overview in European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: The Gender 
Balance in Business Leadership, SEC (2011) 246 final (Mar. 1, 2011). 
 91. Martin Peltzer, Der Bericht der Corporate Governance Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, 2011 NZG 281, 283 (Ger.). 
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between the absence of women on supervisory boards and their 
exclusion in German supervisory board networks; it also shows that 
supervisory board networks that do have a woman on a supervisory 
board tend to place more women on other boards.92  Since the literature 
on positive economic effects of women in boardrooms is predominately 
from the United States,93 where only about 17% of the independent 
directors are women,94 a more cautious and evolutionary approach might 
be appropriate for European lawmaking on diversity.  At the moment, a 
self-binding declaration of larger companies seems to be the most 
feasible policy option.95  Whether there will be a legal duty to make such 
a declaration is not yet clear.  In October 2011, the DAX 30-companies 
declared that they were aiming to enhance the proportion of women in 
higher management;96 all but two made self-binding declarations, which 
generally aimed for significant future improvement.  Quotas in 
individual companies currently range from 7.6% to 28.5%; however, 
quota increase goals aim to raise this range from over 10% to 32% 
between 2015 and 2020; the company with the highest ratio today plans 
to increase its quota by between 1% and 2% per year.97 
In March 2012, the parliamentary group (Fraktion) of the German 
Social Democratic Party (“SPD”) introduced a legislative initiative 
proposing a quota for supervisory boards of 30% female in 2013 and 
40% in 2015.98  Within the German government, three ministers, all of 
whom are women, are involved in this issue.  The Minister of Labor 
(Mrs. Von der Leyen) supports a quota,99 the Minister of Family (Mrs. 
Schröder) proposes a flexible quota (Flexiquote) set by the companies 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Michael Wolff et al., Der Einfluss der Aufsichtsratszusammensetzung auf die 
Präsenz von Frauen in Aufsichtsräten, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG [zfbf] 503, 523 (Ger.). 
 93. See, e.g., Carter et al., supra note 74. 
 94. SPENCER STUART, 2012 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 16 (2012) (finding 
17% of independent directors are women, up from 12 % in 2000). 
 95. A study for the Ministry for Family, Elder, Woman and Youth is presented by 
Marc-Philippe Weller (University of Freiburg), see FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG 19 (Aug. 6, 2011) (on file with author).  
 96. Florian Gathmann & Christian Teevs, Zwei Ministerinnen im Quotenkampf, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ 
0,1518,792261,00.html (Ger.). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Equal Opportunities Draft Bill, BT 17/8878 (Ger.). 
 99. See Gesetz geplant: Von der Leyen will Frauenquote bis 2013 durchboxen, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 16, 2011, 11:07 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/ 
gesetz-geplant-von-der-leyen-will-frauenquote-bis-2013-durchboxen-a-768884.html. 
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themselves, and the Minister of Justice (Mrs. Leutheuser-
Schnarrenberger) rejects a quota outright.100  The Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Merkel, is said to swing towards the promoters of a mandatory quota.101 
In December 2012 the German conservatives agreed to the introduction 
of a flexible quota.102  Consequently, the German Government at least 
initially rejected the European proposal for a strict quota.103 
The details of the legislative proposal are as follows: from 2013, 
supervisory boards shall consist of 30% women and management boards 
shall consist of 20% women.104  From 2015, management boards with 
four managing directors shall consist of 25% women and management 
boards with at least nine members shall consist of (at least) 40% 
women.105  For supervisory boards, women shall make up at least 40% 
of the board (if the number of directors greater than three).106  The quota 
for the supervisory board would apply to both shareholder and employee 
representatives.107  Due to the separate counting of men and women for 
employee and shareholder representatives,108 the 2013 quotas will 
effectively already be higher.  The sanctions for failing to comply are 
important, as elections for supervisory board members shall only be 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See Kerstin Schwenn & Hendrik Kafsack, Schröder will ein Gesetz zur 
flexiblen Frauenquote, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (June 14 , 2012), available 
at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/gleichbehandlung-schroeder-will-ein-gesetz-
zur-flexiblen-frauenquote-11786059.html; Justizministerin will Konzernen bis 2013 
Zeit geben, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2011, 8:42 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ 
deutschland/gesetzliche-frauenquote-justizministerin-will-konzernen-bis-2013-zeit-
geben-a-792124.html. 
 101. Merkel bei Frauenquote auf Schröders Seite, HANDELSBLATT, (July 23, 2012, 
3:01 PM) (Ger.), http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fuehrungspositionen-
merkel-bei-frauenquote-auf-schroeders-seite/6910712.html. 
 102. See Christlich Demokratische Union, 25. Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands, 
Beschluss: Starkes Deutschland. Chancen für Alle!, Kompetenzen von Frauen besser 
nutzen 7–8 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/ 
dokumente/antrag-starkes-deutschland-chancen-fuer-alle.pdf.  
 103. “Einsatz für Frauenquote war nie mehr als Schamschlägerei”, SÜDDEUTSCHE 
ZEITUNG, Mar. 6, 2013, at 5.  For later developments infra note 112. 
 104. Equal Opportunities Draft Bill, BT 17/8878, art. 1, 13 no. 1. 
 105. Id., art. 2, 13 no. 2 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 76(4)). 
 106. Id., art. 2, 13 no. 2 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (4) 
1). 
 107. Id., art. 1, 2, 13 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (3) 1, (4) 
1). 
 108. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (3)). 
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possible if the quotas are met.109  If the election fails for this reason and 
it is not resolved during the next annual general meeting, another 
proposed provision will apply: if the supervisory board does not satisfy 
the quota provided for by law or the articles of association, it will no 
longer be able to take resolutions.110  According to the proposal of the 
German Upper House of September 2012 and the current proposal by 
the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, a 40% quota for larger 
supervisory boards shall be introduced until 2023.111  Shortly before the 
German Bundestag rejected that proposal in April 2013, the German 
conservatives agreed to implement a call for a 30% quota in 2020 in its 
programme for the elections in September 2013.112 
The United Kingdom contributes to the debate in another way by 
amending the UK Corporate Governance Code to provide for a flexible 
quota.  Transparency is also to be provided due to a proposed European 
directive amending the European Audit Directives.113  Economists 
studying the Norwegian experience showed that companies with less 
than two women on their boards suffered from having to implement the 
high quota of 40% all at once.114  In 2012, the German government 
published the Eighth Family Report115 calling for part-time employment 
for senior employees as well, which may lead to more qualified women 
in the future. 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 101 
(1a)). 
 110. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 108 (2) 
5). 
 111. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von Frauen 
und Männdern in Führungsgremien (GlTeilhG), supra note 88. See also DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG: GESETZENTWURF [BT] 17/11139, Art. 2, 16, providing tax-consequences 
for non-compliance with Art. 13. 
 112. The conservatives overruled the party resolution of December 2012. See 
Gender Gap: Germany Rejects Law Requiring Board Quotas, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 
18, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-rejects-law-
requiring-board-quotas-a-895238.html. 
 113. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amdending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards 
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and 
groups, at art. 1 (2), COM (2013) 207 final (Apr. 16, 2013). 
 114. See Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 75 at 162–69, 192–94. 
 115. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN UND JUGEND, ZEIT FÜR 
FAMILIE, FAMILIENZEITPOLITIK ALS CHANCE EINER NACHHALTIGEN FAMILIENPOLITIK, 
ACHTER FAMILIENBERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG (2012). 
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B. PENSION SYSTEM IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 
1. The German Focus on State Pensions and Life Insurance 
In the nineteenth century, Germany introduced the well-known 
Bismarck pension laws.116  Less known is the academic foundation for 
introducing social security.  Viewed from a twenty-first century 
perspective, German social security might be seen as an early result of 
law and economy.117  Early German economists promoted the 
introduction of social security.  Corresponding to the Austrian 
“Nationalökonomie,” the German “Verein für Socialpolitik” (German 
Economic Association) promoted a solution for the “soziale Frage” 
(social question).118  Heavy critique resulted in the phrasing of 
“Kathedersozialist” (lectern-socialist), which is still rooted in German 
language.119  At that time, German social security was capital-funded, 
providing disability as well as pension insurance.120  The retirement age 
was 70,121 equal or even greater to the average life expectancy at the 
time.122  Capital-funded state pensions were later given up due to the 
First World War and hyperinflation in the 1920s.123  Today, the German 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Gesetz betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung [Disability and Old-
Age Insurance Act], June 22, 1889, RGBL. at 97 (Ger.). 
 117. Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, Divergente Evolution des Rechtsdenkens 
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state pension is a pay-as-you-go scheme and and provides for most of 
Germany’s retirement income—this is the real first pullar.124  Since the 
so-called Riester-reform, the second and third pillars (private pensions 
such as occupational pensions and individual pensions, respectively) 
have gained momentum.125  The fact that the third pillar occupies a 
greater role in society than the second pillar causes widely-accepted cost 
efficiency problems. 
2. Employee participation Via Private Pensions in the United States 
In the United States, more emphasis is placed on occupational 
pensions;126 social security is not as close to the insurance principle as it 
is in the German system.  Unlike in Germany, US state pensions were 
never expected to provide a full retirement income for large parts of the 
population.127  United States pension assets are therefore by far the 
greatest asset in US capital markets and account for almost half of the 
world’s occupational pension assets.128  This is attributed to both state 
pension funds and a ‘union pension premium.’129  As of 2008, state 
pension funds were said to hold one-fifth of US-listed equity.130  Even if 
they hold only one-tenth of US equity,131 state pension funds play a 
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pivotal role in shaping corporate governance in the United States and 
worldwide due to the sheer size of their investment portfolios: it was 
CalPERS which paved the way for activist corporate governance by 
shareholders.132  As an association primarily representing the state 
pension funds, CII was instrumental in promoting the independent 
director paradigm and the corporate governance rules under the Dodd-
Frank Act.133 
3. Occupational Pensions in Germany 
A union pension premium as seen in the United States134 is not 
common in Germany.  While occupational pensions in Germany are 
widespread in the financial and chemical industries, industrywide 
pension provisions—as in the electro and metal industries—are 
relatively new phenomenons, having been introduced in 2001.135  
Metallrente, a joint-venture of the employer association Gesamtmetall 
and the union IG Metall, now owns assets of 1.5 billion Euros.  Unlike 
in Switzerland and the Netherlands, occupational pensions in Germany 
are not subject to collective bargaining by the unions.136  In some cases, 
there is collective bargaining of works councils at the plant level.137  In 
the case of Metallrente, providing occupational pensions is merely a 
choice for the employee, and not a duty.138 
Direct pension promises is the default rule in Germany, and until 
2001, pension promises were mandatorily linked to the earnings of the 
company for adjustments in retirement.139  The German Occupational 
Pensions Act provides that pensions have to be adjusted for inflation if 
the financial situation of the company allows for it.140  The German 
Federal Labor Court ruled that adjustments do not have to be paid for 
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out of the substance (assets), but rather from the revenues of the 
company, and of the revenues, that a reasonable interest rate—the 
interest rate for secured bonds plus 2%—has to be left out to allow for 
further investments as well as an appropriate return on investment in 
order to secure the existence of the company first.141 
Pensions of state employees in Germany are at best partly 
funded.142  The biggest German public pension fund is the 
“Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder” (VBL), which 
provides occupational pensions for public employees at the federal and 
state levels and has over €16 billion under management,143 compared to 
CalPERS $257 billion.144  In the United States, a large proportion of 
pension assets are held by public pension funds,145 even if the 
underfunding of such funds is a subject of concern. 
Neither Germany nor the United States is likely to exercise best 
practices in pension policy.  According to data provided by the OECD, 
Germany and the United States provide under-average replacement 
ratios, especially for low incomes.146  Moreover, only a minority of the 
working age population is enrolled in an occupational pension plan.147  
Therefore, in both the United States and Germany, automatic 
enrollment, as in the UK Pension Act 2008,148 would enhance prospects 
for future retirees.  Such reform has been suggested in Germany, inter 
alia, by the German Jurist Forum in 2004 and the Association for 
Occupational Pensions (“Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche 
Altersversorgung, AbA”) in 2011, as well as in the United States by 
various authors on the basis of several empirical studies.149 
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4. Corporate Finance and the Trend from Defined Benefits to Defined 
Contributions 
In the 1970s, Peter Drucker estimated that pension funds of the 
private sector held a quarter of all listed equity in the United States.150  
Since then, employee stock ownership programs (ESOPs) have been 
strongly promoted.151  David Blake estimates that United Kingdom 
companies in the late twenteeth century owned a third of each other via 
their pension funds.152  In post-World War II Germany, direct pension 
promises (“Direktzusagen”) contributed about 20% to self-financing of 
German firms.153  Due to the trend towards asset funding and 
international investments in equity (advisors conversely refer to a home 
bias in promoting international investments), direct and indirect self-
financing is in decline. 
Pursuant to ERISA,154 asset funding has been legally required since 
1974 in the United States.155  Whether such asset funding is 
counteracting the alignment of employee and employer interests is now 
subject to discussion in the United States.  The idea behind the 
promotion of occupational, and not state, pensions by General Motors in 
the 1950s was to invest in the American economy.156  In the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, General Motors had to file for insolvency due 
to pension and health care obligations.157  This is expected to result in 
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further caution towards defined benefit promises, and is likely to propel 
the trend towards defined contributions even more.158 
The trend from defined benefit to defined contribution must be seen 
against the backdrop of the lack of, or at least limited, financial risk for 
employers until the era of codification of occupational pension law in 
the 1970s.159  In Germany, employers were allowed to revoke pension 
promises due to financial distress until the enactment of the Act on 
Better Occupational Pensions in 1974; even later on, there was still 
limited scope to do this.160  In the United States, the insolvency of car 
manufacturer Studebaker gave rise to ERISA in response to employees 
and retirees losing all their pension claims.161  Employers in the United 
States responded by switching pension promises from defined benefit to 
defined contribution, thereby shifting the asset management and 
longevity risks to the employees.162  In Germany, employers reduced 
pension promises in general; the increase in pension promises since 
2001 is due to the right of employees to convert up to 4% of their 
income into occupational pensions.163 
C. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
1. The Rise of Institutional Investors in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom 
The National Bureau of Statistics has closely documented the rise 
of institutional investors in the United Kingdom.  In the 1970s and 80s, 
British institutional investors already held the majority of UK equity.164  
This was also due to Maynard Keynes, who advocated investments in 
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equity while serving as an advisor to British insurers.165  While British 
life insurance companies have invested heavily in equity, such 
investments are rare internationally and in most countries, restricted by 
supervisory agencies.166  In the United States, reported percentages of 
equity held by institutional investors differ substantially.  Gordon asserts 
that institutional investors already held the majority of US shares in the 
1980s,167 while Cheffins says that this occurred at least in the 1990s,168 
and Armour and Skeel date this to the 2000s.169  The Conference Board 
provides related data, claiming that institutional shareholding has 
declined in the new millennium.170  Data from the US Census Bureau for 
2010 report households and foreigners holding about 50% of US equity, 
slightly more than the combined figures of pension funds, life insurance 
companies, mutual funds and ETFs.171 
The rise of institutional shareholders was legally embedded in 
generously sponsored, funded occupational and individual pension 
regimes.  As previously discussed, US occupational pension law 
literature hints at the irony that it was auto giant General Motors that 
pressed for generous occupational pensions to prevent the rise of 
‘socialism’ by granting sufficient state pensions to the middle class.  In 
the 1970s, the iconic Peter Drucker commented on this in his book, The 
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Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America.172 
In the 1980s, Robert Clark promoted the idea of four stages of 
capitalism, beginning with the separation of ownership and management 
and continuing with institutional investors telling the people how much 
money they need to save.173  In 2008, GM went bankrupt largely due to 
its underfunded pension plan.  For airlines in the United States, filing 
Chapter 11 has been a business model for much of the twenty-first 
century.174 
In the United States, the value of pension assets is about the same 
as GDP.175   In the 1970s, US trust law was re-designed according to the 
portfolio theory,176 and in the 1980s, states began to allow their pension 
funds to invest a higher ratio in equity.177  The United Kingdom 
followed suit; supervisory authorities traditionally allow life insurance 
companies to invest substantial parts of their assets in equity.178   In 
other countries, such as the United States and Germany, supervisory 
authorities limit investments in equities to contracts with guarantees.179 
2. Institutional Investors and Foreign Shareholdings 
Following the rise of institutional investors, foreign stock 
ownership rose considerably.  According to data from the advisory firm 
Towers Watson, US occupational pension assets are worth $16 trillion 
in total,180 with equity holdings of 44% and about $7 trillion invested in 
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stock.181  It is estimated that about one-fourth of all equity is invested 
abroad, accounting for about the same as, or perhaps even exceeding, 
the market capitalization of all German equities.182   According to the 
US Department of Treasury, US portfolio holdings of foreign securities 
account for 13% of market capitalization of the German stock market, 
with comparable or even higher figures for other industrial countries: 
18% in Canada, 12% in France, 11% in Japan, 17% in the Netherlands, 
11% in South Korea, 26% in Switzerland, and 19% in the UK.183  In the 
case of Germany, the total US equity investments nearly tripled from the 
end of 2001 to the end of 2009, increasing from about $70 billion184 to 
about $200 billion.185  During this time, the German market 
capitalization shrank by nearly 20%.186 
3. Occupational Pensions and Foreign Shareholdings in Germany 
In contrast to the United States, German pension assets account for 
only $498 billion,187 significantly less than half of the total market 
capitalization of German equity. About €170 billion of occupational 
pension assets are invested in DAX 30-companies, which invest about 
20% in equity.188  Since other pension institutions are even more 
reluctant to invest in equity,189 10% of all occupational pension assets 
invested in equity is likely to be a good guess, totaling about $50 billion.  
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Even if all of this equity was German stock, this would not amount to 
more than 5% of the total market capitalization of German equity.190 
Due to the internationalization of equity investment in Germany, it 
is likely that US pension funds invested in Germany doubles or triples 
the amount of domestic pension money.191  Considering UK and other 
pension money as well, foreign pension funds invested in German 
equity might be five times higher than domestic pension funds in 
Germany, and perhaps even up to ten times higher.192  It is also for this 
reason that domestic institutional investors play a minor role in 
Germany, and foreign institutional investors are assumed to hold the 
majority of shares in most German blue chips (DAX 30-companies).193  
According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, considerably more than 
40% of shares, in terms of market value, are in the hands of foreign 
investors.194  Such ratios are also reported for other European countries 
such as the United Kingdom, France and Belgium,195 while in the United 
States less than 20% of equity is in the hands of foreign investors.196 
Investor relations websites of the top fifteen German blue chips 
show that according to market capitalization, most of them have no 
controlling shareholder.197  Only VW, BMW and Henkel are de facto 
controlled by families or the state; these families and the state have a 
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significant role in VW, with the Porsche and Piech family controlling 
the Porsche holding of 51% of VW, the German state Lower Saxony 
holding another 20%, and Quatar holding 17% (these percentages refer 
to voting shares; VW is in the DAX with preference shares giving no 
voting rights).198  The other companies have no German investor holding 
more than 10%.  Of the twelve companies whose shares are in free float 
(out of fifteen with the biggest market capitalization), virtually all of 
them are in foreign hands, meaning a majority of foreign shareholdings.  
Only Deutsche Bank is regularly switching from domestic to foreign 
shareholder majority.199  In the case of BASF, foreign majority is likely 
but not entirely clear.200  These two exceptions among the companies in 
free float may also serve as examples of a long-term shareholder basis 
through generous employee participation in company stock.201 
D. PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. The Influence of Institutional Shareholders on US and UK Corporate 
Governance 
The term corporate governance came into vogue, or at least was 
established, in the United States.202  Corporate governance began to 
emerge with the inspections of companies reporting on bribes of foreign 
officials, resulting in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act203 and later the 
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OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.204  In academia, the work of 
Eisenberg was influential in this area.205  In practice, an association of 
state pension funds promoted corporate governance, with CalPERS the 
largest by assets, and CII.  CII calls itself the ‘voice of corporate 
governance’ and stated that it championed the independent director 
paradigm which was later adopted.206  The National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF) has been of similar, if not greater, importance in 
the United Kingdom.  In preparing a collection of essays,207 the Cadbury 
Report, they serve as a good starting point of the European corporate 
governance debate.  When the Cadbury Report was issued, UK 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, 
held over half of the equity of UK listed companies.208 
2. The European Code of Conduct Movement 
In the United States, corporate governance standards are mandatory 
in the listing rules209 and are not restricted to a comply-or-explain basis 
as in Europe.  This more liberal regulatory approach was developed in 
the United Kingdom, where the European corporate governance debate 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See generally THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS OF 21 NOVEMBER 1997, (Marc Pieth et al. 
eds., 2007); see also Markus Roth, Die OECD-Empfehlung im Gesamtzusammenhang 
der Verhinderung von Bestechung, 56 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 
[RIW] 737 (2010). 
 205. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1976). 
 206. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (CII), http://www.cii.org/about_us (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013). Former version (http://www.cii.org/about/who_we_serve.) 
accessible via the webarchive, stated under the headline ‘Improving Corporate 
Governance’:  
Many of the Council’s corporate governance policies, once considered radical, are 
now in the mainstream. Principles that we championed over time—from director 
independence to clear links between executive pay and company performance—have 
been adopted by U.S. companies; enshrined in regulation, legislation and stock 
exchange listing standards; and emulated abroad. 
 207. NAT’L ASS’N OF PENSION FUNDS, CREATIVE TENSION? NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF PENSION FUNDS (1990). 
 208. For the development of share ownership in the United Kingdom, see Armour & 
Skeel, supra note 169, at 1768–70. 
 209. See, e.g., Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 Corporate Governance Standards 
NYSE (2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp? 
selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (listing 
the Corporate Governance rules of NYSE-listed companies). 
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began.210  Consistent with the regulatory philosophy of the City Code on 
Takeovers,211 the Cadbury Report and the Combined Code, now the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, used the comply-or-explain principle.  
This tenet operated as the role model for the European Union, which 
introduced the comply-or-explain principle in the Fourth Council 
Directive in 2006.212  Codes of conduct are better suited to more diverse 
companies according to shareholder structure, especially to companies 
with significant shareholders, and to co-determination and companies in 
countries with extensive regulation in stock corporation acts, such as 
Germany.213  In Germany, the comply-or-explain principle has been part 
of the German Stock Corporation Act since 2002.214  Initially only for 
listed companies, the Act now also applies to other capital market-
oriented companies as well.215 
E. THEORY OF THE FIRM 
1. The Shareholder Value Puzzle 
From a continental European perspective, one of the corporate 
governance puzzles that US academia and practice almost universally 
accept is that while the firm is a nexus of contracts,216 shareholder 
primacy sets the standard for corporate action.217  In terms of 
shareholder power vis-à-vis management, however, such shareholder 
primacy was in part implemented only after the financial crisis by the 
Dodd-Frank Act.218  In Germany it is accepted that management may 
also take into account interests of other stakeholders, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art 
and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11–14 (2011). 
 211. For the UK Takeover Code, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 169, at 1727–30. 
 212. European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/46, art. 1, no. 7, 2006 O.J. (L 
224) 4 (EC) (amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies). 
 213. See Hopt, supra note 210, at 12. 
 214. Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1089, 
§ 161, as amended, Dec. 2012 (Ger.). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). 
 217. See ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: A GUIDE FOR 
MANAGERS AND INVESTORS (1998). 
 218. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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employees;219 in contrast to the US, some go so far as to say that the 
enterprise is more than the company as a legal form; it also consists of 
the interests of the employees and other stakeholders.220 
2. Pensions Bridging the Rift Between Shareholder Value and the 
Stakeholder Approach 
The rift between the shareholder and the stakeholder approach may 
be bridged by focusing on long-termism as an appropriate overarching 
corporate governance principle in times of pension capitalism.221  
Mirroring their own interests in a long-term increase in corporate value, 
private pension institutions place emphasis on sustainable corporate 
growth.  Under the Corporate Governance Principles of Hermes, the 
primary goal is managing companies and establishing value in the long-
term interest of shareholders.222  The doctrines championed by CalPERS 
are based on the conviction that the structures set up by their principles 
will deliver the best long-term results for shareholders.223  The Corporate 
Governance Principles of Hermes assume that independent directors are 
most likely to make decisions in the interests of all long-term 
shareholders.224  This focus on the long-term interests of shareholders 
ensures that shareholder interests are taken into account, as a company 
can only be successful in the long run if it has sufficient regard for the 
interests of customers, suppliers, and employees.225 
                                                                                                                 
 219. For a long-term focus on plurality of interests, see Michael Kort, in 
AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR § 76, no. 52 ff (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann 
eds., 4th ed. 2002); leaning towards this view now, Peter O. Mülbert, Soziale 
Verantwortung von Unternehmen im Gesellschaftsrecht, 2009 AG 766, 774. 
 220. On this discussion, see Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 65. 
 221. See infra Part IV. 
 222. HERMES PENSIONS MGMT. LTD., THE HERMES PRINCIPLES (2002); HERMES INV. 
MGMT., INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 1 (1999) [hereinafter 
HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES]; HERMES INV. MGMT. LTD., THE 
HERMES RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES (2013) [hereinafter HERMES 
RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES]. 
 223. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM (CALPERS), 
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, § III.A. (last 
updated Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES]. 
 224. HERMES RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 222, § XI (the ability 
for boards to “act objectively and independently in the long-term interest of the 
company and its shareholders”). 
 225. Roth, Private Altersvorsorge 2011, supra note 1, at 540. 
784 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
By focusing on long-term shareholder value, the enlightened 
shareholder value approach is appropriately implemented.226  This idea 
largely levels the classical conflict between the shareholder and 
stakeholder approaches.  In the long term, shareholder value should only 
be created if the company also promotes the interests of employees, 
clients, suppliers, and the public.227  However, such a long term focus 
might be better implemented by also choosing a design which 
implements a more diverse view by giving human capital a “say” in 
corporate governance.228  Referring to corporate governance principles 
established in the United States, the independent directors provided for 
in the Investment Act of 1940 had a significant impact some fifty years 
later on the governance of “normal” firms.229  The representation of 
workers in United States pension funds, as required by some state 
laws—e.g., California’s CalPERS—might play a similar role in the 
future. 
In Germany, there is a long doctrinal tradition of including 
stakeholder interests in the company enterprise.230  The German 
Corporate Governance Code endorses this approach by reference in its 
preamble to the interest of the enterprise.  The Code “clarifies” the 
obligation of the management and supervisory boards to ensure the 
continued existence of the enterprise, as well as its sustainable creation 
of value in conformity with the principles of the social market 
economy.231  According to the German Code, the management board is 
responsible for independently managing the enterprise in its own best 
interest,232 thus taking into account the interests of shareholders, 
employees, and other stakeholders, with the objective of sustainable 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Without such long-term focus, see, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 
(Eng.). 
 227. For a US perspective, see Hansmann, supra note 151, at 1816 (expressing the 
view that companies run for employees often perform better). 
 228. For German co-determination regimes, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 229. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 230. See WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN: EINE GESCHÄFTLICHE 
BETRACHTUNG 62 (1917). 
 231. See GOV’T COMM’N, DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK] 
[GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE] Foreword (2012), translation available at 
http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_CorGov_ 
final_May_2012.pdf. 
 232. See id. § 4.1.1. 
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creation of value.  Works councils, as company institutions within the 
company, are especially relevant in large companies. 
The long-term shareholder value approach is aligned with the 
classical German approach of corporate interest 
(Unternehmensinteresse).233  According to Gerhard Spindler, § 70 AktG 
of 1937 cannot be classified solely as a National Socialist provision.234  
Rather, the provision can also be based on the theory of the corporation 
(Theorie des Unternehmens); F.A. Mann has emphasized the influence 
of the teachings of the corporation (des Unternehmens) (§ 70 AktG) as 
such.235  Even the Government Draft Bill of 1930 explicitly recognized 
the principle that the “corporate interest as such is equally worthy of 
protection as interests of individual shareholders” (“dass die Interessen 
des Unternehmens als solches ebenso schutzbedürftig sind wie das 
individuelle Interesse des Aktionärs”), and concluded that if the 
company is managed properly and individual shareholders have an 
appropriate attitude, the interests of the company and shareholders 
should converge.236 
3. The European Company 
About half of all operating European companies, and an even larger 
share of co-determined European companies, are of German origin;237 a 
partial explanation for this increasing number of European companies in 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See ARNDT RIECHERS, DAS “UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH”: DIE ENTWICKLUNG EINES 
BEGRIFFS IN DER AKTIENRECHTSDISKUSSION DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS (1996). 
 234. GERALD SPINDLER, HANS-BÖCKLER STIFTUNG, UNTERNEHMENSINTERESSE ALS 
LEITLINIE DES VORSTANDSHANDELNS – BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG VON 
ARBEITNEHMERINTERESSEN UND SHAREHOLDER VALUE [COMPANIES INTERESTS AS A 
GUIDELINE OF BOARD ACTION - CONSIDERATION OF EMPLOYEE INTERESTS AND 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE] 4 (2008). 
 235. Frederick A. Mann, The New German Company Law and Its Background, 19 J. 
COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 220, 227 (1937). 
 236. ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ÜBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND 
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN AUF AKTIEN SOWIE ENTWURF EINES 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZES NEBST ERLÄUTERNDEN BEMERKUNGEN: ERLÄUTERNDE 
BEMERKUNGEN, EINLEITUNG 94 (1930). 
 237. According to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 121 out of 244 
European Companies with more than five employees are located in Germany as well as 
40 out of 49 co-determined European Companies, ETUI, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE 
OF SE FOUNDING IN EUROPE, Update: 1 April 2013, 3, 10 
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Germany is the German co-determination law.238  While in German 
stock corporations only employees employed in Germany are 
represented in supervisory boards, in European companies (Societas 
Europaea, SE),239 employees located in other European Union countries 
are also represented.240  Considering, inter alia, the demands for greater 
diversity on the supervisory boards, it appears questionable how long 
international pension funds will put up with the outmoded German co-
determination model.241  The recommendation by the study group on co-
determination (“Arbeitskreis “Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung”) to 
introduce a regime similar to the SE242 has rather unsurprisingly been 
rejected by the labor unions.243  International institutional investors are 
also questioning the mandatory participation of labor unions.244  Against 
this backdrop, Hermes is encouraging companies to consider a 
conversion to an SE.245  A striking observation in practical terms is that 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See Horst Eidenmüller et al., Incorporating under European Law: The Societas 
Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
LAW REVIEW [EBOR] 1, 32 (2009) (U.K.). 
 239. See ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON THE OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE 
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY (SE): FINAL REPORT 246 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 
ERNST & YOUNG STUDY] (explicitly labeling this as an advantage of the SE).  On 
December 31, 2008, more than half of all SEs were incorporated/domiciled in Germany 
(45 of 73). See Berndt Keller & Frank Werner, Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (SE) – Empirische Befunde und (un-)erwartete 
Konsequenzen, 62 WSI MITTEILUNGEN 416, 419 tbl.2 (2009). 
 240. See Council Directive 2001/86 of 8 October 2001 Supplementing the Statute 
for a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees, 2001 O.J. (L 
294) 22 (EC). 
 241. See Rüdiger von Rosen, Kapitalmarkt und Mitbestimmung, in STEFAN 
GRUNDMANN ET AL., UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS: 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EBERHARD SCHWARK ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 789, 799 (Christine 
Windbichler et al. eds., 2009) (maintaining the continued need for reform). 
 242. Arbeitskreis ‘Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung,’ Entwurf einer Regelung zur 
Mitbestimmungsvereinbarung sowie zur Größe des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats, 30 
ZIP 885 (2009). 
 243. For an unambiguous account, see the contribution by Hexel in the roundtable 
discussion, 30 ZIP (Beilage zu Heft 48) 35, 36 (2009). 
 244. Thomas von Oehsen, Die Rolle von ISS im Kapitalmarkt und Perspektiven 
guter Corporate Governance, in 65. DEUTSCHER BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTER-TAG 2011, 
45 (2012). 
 245. HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES – GERMANY (2011). On the construction of the co-determination regime of 
the SE in Germany, Austria, Sweden and France, see Claudia Schubert, The National 
Implementation of Employee Participation in the Administrative Board of the SE in the 
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all German co-determined SEs have so far chosen a dualistic board.246  
This should change, however, if the proposal by Ernst & Young is 
adopted, under the terms of which the SE statute would explicitly limit 
equal co-determination to non-executive directors.247 
II. INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR PARADIGM AND BOARD COMMITTEES 
A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN THE US, EUROPE AND ASIA 
1. The Rise of Independent Boards 
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, place great value 
on independent supervisory boards or board members.248  On its website, 
the CII demands at least two-thirds of board members to be 
independent.249  In the early 1990s, the Cadbury Report provided for 
more than half of the non-executive board to be independent.250  The 
Combined Code has now extended this quota to the entire board; smaller 
companies should have at least two independent directors.251  The 
Principles of Corporate Governance of the Hermes pension fund deal 
with the ideal proportion of independent directors at the country level: in 
                                                                                                                 
One-tier Model – A Legal Comparison on the Basis of Germany, Austria, Sweden, and 
France, 5 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. [ECFR] 422 (2008). 
 246. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 83. An exception to this is 
PUMA (a listed company with a foreign majority shareholder), which has converted to 
a monistic board system. 
 247. See 2009 ERNST & YOUNG STUDY, supra note 239, at 285 (discussing Art. 43 of 
SE Regulation). 
 248. See Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance 
Preferences of Institutional Investors 51–52 tbl. IV, V (AFA 2011 Denver Meetings 
Paper, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 10, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571046. 
 249. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
POLICIES § 2.3, available at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies (last updated Oct. 5, 
2012). 
 250. See Report of the Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (Cadbury Report), reprinted in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, Annex I/1 § 2.2 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 
1997); see also John C. Shaw, The Cadbury Report, Two Years Later, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, at 41. 
 251. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § A.3.2 (2010) (U.K.), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-Combined-Code-on-Corporate-
Goverance.aspx. 
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the US, a simple majority; in Brazil, at least one-third must be 
independent.252  In its Guide for Superannuation Trustees, the Australian 
Council of Superinvestors (“ACSI”) requires a majority of the board to 
be independent.253  Yet, there is no evidence on whether independent 
boards generate greater value.254 
For the United States, CII corporate governance principles require 
that at least two-thirds of the board members be independent.255  This 
exceeds considerably the listing rules of NYSE and NASDAQ, which 
require only a majority-independent board,256 and has contributed to the 
fact that in the United States more than 80% of directors are 
independent.257  In fact, the United States probably has the highest ratio 
of independent directors in the world.258   Another explanation for this 
might be its relatively lenient standards for independence.  In contrast to 
the European Union, the US’s list of requirements for independence is 
relatively short and more lenient; for example, significant shareholders 
and their representatives are considered to be independent.259  Even if 
the US is not famous for concentrated ownership, this might have an 
effect since founder-directors in tech firms can be treated as independent 
even with voting shares of 10% or higher. 
                                                                                                                 
 252. See, e.g., HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – UNITED STATES (2012); HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – BRAZIL (2012). 
 253. See AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), A GUIDE FOR 
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES TO MONITOR LISTED AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES (ACSI 
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES: MAY 2009) § 5(d) (2009). 
 254. Luca Enriques, Reinier Kraakman & Henry B. Hansmann, The Basic 
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 56, 66 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008); Sanjai Bhagat & 
Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term 
Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002); see also the overview by Gordon, 
supra note 167, at 1500–09. 
 255. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 249, § 2.3. 
 256. See NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 
5605(b)(1); NYSE EURONEXT, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01. 
 257. SPENCER STUART US BOARD INDEX 2011, at 8 (2011) (84%). 
 258. For the United States, see id.  For Europe, see HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, 
EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2011: CHALLENGING BOARD 
PERFORMANCE 42 fig.35 (2011). With better data, see Enriques et al., supra note 254, at 
56, 70. 
 259. NASDAQ, supra note 256, § 5605(a)(2) (defining “independence”). 
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According to a European survey by Heidrick & Struggles, fewer 
independent directors are found in Europe.260  In the Netherlands, 75% 
of all supervisory board members are independent, as well as 72% in 
Finland; 62% in Switzerland; 61% in the United Kingdom; 51% in 
Norway; and 48% in Italy.261  Countries below the European average of 
43% independent directors are, inter alia, France and Sweden (40%), 
Austria (36%), Spain (33%), Belgium (32%), Denmark (30%), and 
finally Germany (21%), which has lowest ratio of independent directors 
in the survey.262  In most European countries, independence standards 
are stricter than in the United States.263  For example, according to the 
European Recommendation on independence, a significant shareholder 
and his legal representatives are not independent.264  In the United States 
and Switzerland, even majority shareholders traditionally pass as 
independent, although some companies refrain from declaring them as 
such.  For a long time, Germany was reluctant to follow the European 
Union proposal,265 but recently the Government Commission on 
Corporate Governance changed the German Corporate Governance 
Code to exclude majority shareholders from being independent.266 
In Asia, independent directors are increasingly incorporated into 
national corporate governance regimes.  By 2001, China had already 
incorporated independent directors into its unique corporate governance 
structure, with a board of directors that is overseen by a supervisory 
board.267   Chinese listing regulations require that a third of the board of 
                                                                                                                 
 260. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258. 
 261. Id. at 42. 
 262. Id. 
 263. For the United States, see NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., NASDAQ STOCK 
MARKET RULES § 5605(a)(2); NYSE EURONEXT, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 
303A.02. Calling for stricter independence standards in the US Hermes Equity 
Ownership Services, Hermes Corporate Governance Principles United States, 
Independence: companies should go beyond the definitions of independence according 
to the NASDAQ and NYSE. The new NYSE rules effective from July 1, 2013 does not 
reflect this. 
 264. Commission Recommendation 2005/162 of 15 Feb. 2005 on the Role of Non-
executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the 
(Supervisory) Board, Annex II, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51, 63 (EC) [hereinafter 
Recommendation No. 2005/162]. 
 265. See infra Part II.C. 
 266. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (2012). 
 267. See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate 
Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 173–74 (2006). 
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directors be independent.268  For South Korea, there is evidence that the 
existence of independent directors correlates with firm performance;269 
South Korea first required outside directors after the Asian crisis.270  
Since the definition of an outside director in the Korean Securities and 
Exchange Act excludes, inter alia, significant shareholders,271 at least 
half of the board has to be independent in large corporations.272  In 
Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange requires the appointment of one 
independent director;273 major shareholders are deemed not to be 
independent,274 and the number of independent directors correlates with 
foreign investments.  While companies with a shareholding ratio below 
10% appointed 1.51 independent directors on average, companies with a 
foreign shareholder ratio of at least 30% have appointed an average of 
2.93 independent directors.275 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of 
Listed Companies - 2001 (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Comm’n., Aug. 
16, 2001) Zhengjianfa [2001] No. 102, Art. I.3 (China), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.htm. 
 269. Jongmoo Jay Choi et al., The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from 
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 941 
(2007); Bernard S. Black et al., How Corporate Governance Affects Firm Value: 
Evidence on Channels from Korea 27 (University of Texas School of Law, Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 51, 2008), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract= 
844744. 
 270. Bernard Black, Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing 
International Competitiveness (Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to 
the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea), 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 554 (2001). 
 271. Korean Securities and Exchange Act, Act No. 972, Jan. 15, 1962, art. 54-5(4), 
amended by Act No. 6695, Apr. 27, 2002, available at http://unpan1.un.org/ 
intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011491.pdf. 
 272. In terms of comparative Corporate Governance, this is a rather strict standard. 
For Switzerland, see ECONOMIESUISSE, SWISS CODE OF BEST PRACTICE FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE II.b.12, g.22 (2007). For the United States, see NASDAQ, supra note 
256, § 5605(a)(2), (b)(1). 
 273. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR SECURITIES LISTING 
REGULATIONS, Rule 436-2 (2012). 
 274. Id. at Rule 211(5)a.(d). 
 275. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC., WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2011, 42 (2011). 
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2. Independent Chairpersons and Committees 
Pension funds worldwide recommend an independent chairperson 
of the board,276 as in the UK Corporate Governance Code277 and the 
ACSI Governance Guidelines.278  Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act 
requires the SEC to pass appropriate rules.279  Under the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, director independence is one of four criteria required 
for an appointment to the board,280 maintaining the requirement that at 
least half of the board members be independent.281  The Green Paper of 
the European Commission follows suit by including independence as a 
factor in selecting boards.282  Internationally, independence of the 
majority of members is not required or practiced for all control organs, 
as is shown by the common global practice of employees sitting on co-
determined boards, or at any rate on the (supervisory) boards of 
occupational pension institutions.  A controversial point is the 
benchmark for determining independence.283  According to the 
recommendation of the EU on the independence of supervisory boards 
and board members, even the representatives of major shareholders are 
                                                                                                                 
 276. See, e.g., CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 223, at III.B., 
Recommended Rule 1.4; HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVICES, LTD., HERMES 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – UNITED STATES 2 (2012) (identifying combined 
Chair/CEO Roles, expectation to split roles); MILLSTEIN CENTER FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, POLICY BRIEFING 
NO. 4: CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE 
NORTH AMERICA 21 (2009) (recommending independent chairmanship as the default 
model). 
 277. Upon appointment, the chairperson should be independent. FIN. REPORTING 
COUNCIL, U.K. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § A.2.1 (2012) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx. 
 278. ACSI GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 253, § 9.2. 
 279. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). 
 280. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § B.1 (“The board and its committees 
should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge 
of the company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities 
effectively.”). 
 281. Id. § B.1.2. 
 282. The Green Paper’s criteria for the selection of board members include: “merit, 
professional qualifications, experience, the personal qualities of the candidate, 
independence and diversity.” Green Paper, supra note 24, at 5, § 1.1. 
 283. Enriques et al., supra note 254, at 64. 
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not considered to be independent.284  Furthermore, and quite 
appropriately, employee representatives are not regarded as 
independent;285 the rights to appoint board members are viewed 
critically.286 
According to the listing requirement of the NYSE and NASDAQ, 
audit committees, nomination committees and remuneration committees 
in the United States have to be fully independent; due to this rule’s 
mandatory nature, companies comply.287  The UK Corporate 
Governance Code does not require full independence for all of these 
committees.288  The EU’s recommendation on independent directors 
requires only a majority of the audit committee, the remuneration 
committee and the nomination committee to be independent.289  Quotas 
in many European countries are lower than this; according to a study by 
Heidrick & Struggles, Germany has the lowest quota among European 
blue chips.290 
In Germany, the nomination committee is restricted to the 
nomination of supervisory directors.291  This allows a co-determination-
                                                                                                                 
 284. Recommendation No. 2005/162, supra note 264, at 63. 
 285. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 100, in AKTIENGESETZ: 
GROßKOMMENTAR,  supra note 35, arguing this point originally, and more recently in 
Christine Windbichler, Die Rolle von Amtsträgern der Betriebsverfassung im 
Aufsichtsrat, in GRUNDMANN ET AL., UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21. 
JAHRHUNDERTS, supra note 241, at 805.  For a view raising doubts on this position, see 
Michael Kort, Standardization of Company Law in Germany, Other EU Member States 
and Turkey by Corporate Governance Rules, 5 ECFR 379, 404 (2008); Michael Kort, 
Interessenkonflikte bei Organmitgliedern der AG, 29 ZIP 717, 725 (2008). 
 286. For example, on the VW decision by the ECJ, see Gert-Jan Vossestein, 
Volkswagen: The State of Affairs of Golden Shares, General Company Law and 
European Free Movement of Capital, 5 ECFR 115, 125 (2008). 
 287. SPENCER STUART, supra note 257, at 9 (stating that only thirteen controlled 
companies do not have a fully independent nomination committee). 
 288. According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the nomination committee 
has to be composed of a majority of independent directors. UK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE § B.2.1 (2012). 
 289. Recommendation No. 2005/162, supra note 264, at 58 Annex I, §§ 2.1.2 
(nomination committee), 3.1.2 (remuneration committee), 60 Annex I, § 4.1 (audit 
committee). 
 290. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 44. 
 291. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.3.3 (2012). 
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free composition.292  A personal or presidential committee commonly 
organizes the nomination and remuneration of managing directors.293   A 
remuneration committee is not specifically recommended, but is only 
mentioned by the German Corporate Governance Code.294  According to 
the German Stock Corporation Act, the remuneration and appointment 
of managing directors are to be decided by the supervisory board as a 
whole.295  Board committees in Germany are also subject to co-
determination.296  In September 2012, the German Jurists Forum 
recommended the introduction of quotas for the audit and remuneration 
committees.297 
B. INDEPENDENCE AND EXPERTISE 
The issue of appropriate expertise of supervisory directors has now 
come to the forefront of debate.298  In Germany, the requirements have 
already been made stricter for credit institutions, insurance companies, 
and pension funds.299  The draft of an act on the supervision of financial 
markets and the insurance industry also included the supervisory boards 
of retirement funds (Pensionskassen).300  This could, however, lead to 
problems for the rather common worldwide practice of employee 
representatives and retirees sitting on co-determined boards in pension 
funds.301  This is one reason why the legislature has refrained from 
                                                                                                                 
 292. According to German Stock Corporation Act § 124(3), resolutions for 
proposing shareholder representatives to be elected by the general meeting may be 
taken by shareholder representatives. 
 293. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 107, in AKTIENGESETZ: 
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 340–47. 
 294. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.1, 2. 
 295. German Stock Corporation Act § 107(3). 
 296. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 107, in AKTIENGESETZ: 
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 277–89. 
 297. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section, 
Resolution 12.d.aa-12.d.bb. 
 298. See Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: 
Private vs. Public Banks in Germany, in 60 ECONOMIC POLICY 701 (2009) (finding the 
expertise of supervisory directors enhanced the performance of banks). 
 299. Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarkt- und Versicherungsaufsicht vom 
29.7.2009, July 29, 2009, BGBL. I at 2305 (Ger.). 
 300. For the governmental draft, see DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: GESETZENTWURF DER 
BUNDESREGIERUNG [BT] 16/12783 (Ger.). 
 301. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 211. 
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requiring a minimum level of expertise for supervisory board members 
of retirement funds.302 
C. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN GERMANY 
The term independent director is not defined in the Stock 
Corporation Act.303  For the independence criterion of the “financial 
expert,” introduced by the German Stock Corporation Act to transpose 
the revised Auditor Directive,304 academia draws on the February 15, 
2005 European Commission Recommendation regarding the role of 
non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and 
committees of the (supervisory) board.305  In contrast to the European 
Recommendation and the UK Corporate Governance Code, the German 
Corporate Governance Code provides a short list of criteria that indicate 
a lack of independence.  This short list was recently proposed by the 
Governance Code Commission,306 but dropped after public 
consultation.307 
According to the German Corporate Governance Code of May 
2012,308 a supervisory board member is considered to be independent if 
he or she has no business or personal relations with the company, its 
management board, a controlling shareholder or an enterprise linked to 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Critical of this, see Andreas Hasse, Auswirkungen des Gesetzes zur Stärkung 
der Finanzmarkt- und Versicherungsaufsicht auf die Corporate Governance von 
Versicherungsunternehmen, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERSICHERUNGSRECHT, HAFTUNGS- 
UND SCHADENSRECHT [VersR] 18, 19. 
 303. Mathias Habersack, “Kirch/Deutsche Bank” und die Folgen – Überlegungen zu 
§ 100 Abs. 5 AktG und Ziff. 5.4, 5.5 DCGK -, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WULF GOETTE ZUM 
65. GEBURTSTAG 121, 126 (Mathias Habersack & Peter Hommelhoff eds., 2011). 
 304. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, 
§§ 100(5), 107(4), last amended by Restrukturierungsgesetz [RStruktG] [Restructuring 
Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.). 
 305. Uwe Hüffer, Die Unabhängigkeit von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern nach Ziffer 
5.4.2 DCGK, 27 ZIP 637 (2006). 
 306. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.3.2 (2012), as amended on 
May 26, 2010 with proposals from the plenary session of 17 January 2012, available at 
http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/aenderungen_2012/Kodexaenderungen_final_2012_02_01.pdf. 
 307. Most published statements of interested parties were critical of the list. See 
primarily Deutscher Anwaltverein, Handelsrechtsausschuss, Stellungnahme zu den 
Änderungsvorschlägen der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex vom 1.2.2012, 2012 NZG 335, 337–38. 
 308. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (2012). 
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the controlling shareholder, all of which may cause a conflict of 
interests.  Academia is split on whether the EU Recommendation can be 
used to sharpen the independence requirements in the German Code.309  
Not more than two former members of the management board shall be 
members of the supervisory board; members of the supervisory board 
shall not hold directorships or similar positions, or perform advisory 
tasks for important competitors of the company.310  In making proposals 
for the election of supervisory directors to the general meeting, holdings 
of 10% or more of the shares of the company must be disclosed.311 
The supervisory board shall include what it considers to be an 
adequate number of independent directors.312  The concrete objectives of 
the supervisory board and the status of their implementation shall be 
published in the Corporate Governance Report.313  For Germany, it is 
appropriate to focus on shareholder representatives only; in major 
companies with a diversified shareholder structure, half of the board 
should be independent.314  The proxy-advisor Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”) calls for one-third of the entire board to be 
independent,315 leading to the independence of two-thirds of shareholder 
representatives in quasi-parity co-determined boards.316  On boards with 
a controlling shareholder located in countries that are in line with 
modern European corporate governance standards, e.g., France,317 the 
supervisory board may hold that it is “adequate” if one-third of the 
shareholder representatives are independent.318  For smaller companies, 
such as UK companies outside the FTSE 350,319 two independent 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 629–30 
(assuming a clearly distinct German definition); see also Marcus Lutter, Die 
Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14. 12. 2004 und vom 15. 2. 2005 und ihre 
Umsetzung in Deutschland, 20 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [EuZW] 
799, 804 (2009). 
 310. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (3). 
 311. Id. § 5.4.1 (4), (6). 
 312. Id. § 5.4.2 (1). 
 313. Id. § 5.4.1 (3)2. 
 314. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 636. 
 315. Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc. (ISS), 2012 EUROPEAN PROXY VOTING 
SUMMARY GUIDELINES 8 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. 
 316. See Markus Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, 2012 ZGR 
343, 380. 
 317. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF LISTED CORPORATIONS § 8.2 (2008) (Fr.), 
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/afep_medef_code_dec2008_en.pdf. 
 318. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 636. 
 319. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § B.1.2 (2012) (U.K.). 
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directors is generally sufficient.  Less stringent standards are also 
generally applied in Austria and Sweden, which require only up to two 
independent directors.  In Austria, when the free float is more than 50%, 
the two supervisory directors must also be independent from the 
controlling shareholder; when the free float is over 20%, only one has to 
be independent.320  In Sweden, at least two members must be 
independent in relation to the company’s major shareholders, regardless 
of the company size.321 
It is contested whether employee representatives are independent.  
Unions claim that the employees sitting on the board as employee 
representatives, as well as union delegates representing the employees in 
the supervisory board, are independent.322  Decisions by the courts do 
not make this issue clear, and most academics argue that employee 
representatives are not independent.323  The EU Recommendation 
regarding independent directors324 is somewhat ambiguous, suggesting 
that employee representatives need not be declared non-independent.325  
In a recent survey, advisor Heidrick & Struggles classifies employee 
representatives as a distinct category, leading to far less than half of all 
supervisory directors being considered independent in Germany.326  The 
German Jurists Forum recommends taking co-determination into 
account by articulating requirements for independence.327 
                                                                                                                 
 320. AUSTRIAN CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § C (54) (Austria), available at 
http://www.wienerborse.at/corporate/pdf/CG%20Codex%202012_v5_englisch.pdf. 
 321. Swedish Corporate Governance Code § 4.5 (2010) (Swed.). 
 322. See Roland Köstler, Die Mitbestimmung in der SE, 2003 ZGR 800, 803. 
 323. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 100, in AKTIENGESETZ: 
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 90. 
 324. Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the Role of Non-
executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the 
(Supervisory) Board, 2005/162, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51. 
 325. Id. at 63, Annex II, 1(b). 
 326. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42 (finding the actual number to be 
21% of all supervisory directors). 
 327. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section, 
Resolution 12.a (approved 76:10:9). 
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D. INDEPENDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CO-DETERMINATION AND THE 
TWO-TIER STRUCTURE? 
1. Independent Directors in Co-Determined Boards 
The independent director paradigm was invented in countries in 
which boards were not subject to mandatory co-determination.328  In the 
United States, the independence requirement has existed for a long time.  
Since 1940, the Investment Company Act has required 40% of 
investment fund directors to be independent.329  By contrast, German 
boards today have a rather small ratio of independent directors.330  This 
is due in part to quasi-parity co-determination for large companies with 
over 2,000 employees in Germany.331  Although it is disputed whether 
employee representatives are independent, they are not treated as 
independent by international proxy advisors such as ISS.332  German 
academia is split; the better view is that employee representatives are 
not independent.333  ISS call for the board to be one-third independent in 
co-determined German companies.334  For quasi-parity co-determined 
companies, this means that two-thirds of shareholder representatives 
have to be independent. 
In order to highlight the problems arising from the implementation 
of independence in co-determined boards, it is helpful to note that the 
independence requirement in the US Investment Companies Act is 
contrasted by the absence of independent directors on the boards of 
pension funds.335  Employee representation on boards of occupational 
pension institutions can be found at CalPERS in the US, as well as in the 
UK and Switzerland.  For a long time, Switzerland required mandatory 
parity co-determination in the occupational pension sector.336  In the 
UK, employees must appoint one-third of the trustees, with the State 
                                                                                                                 
 328. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 605. 
 329. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 112-90 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-10 (2006); see also ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 
214-18 ff (discussing the Investment Company Act of 1940 as well as the board 
composition of individual pension institutions with independent directors). 
 330. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258. 
 331. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 332. GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at 12. 
 333. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 630–631. 
 334. See GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at 8 (discussing board independence). 
 335. Only some pension funds like CalPERS give information about their boards. 
 336. Bundesgesetzes über die berufliche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und 
Invalidenversorgung (BVG), AS 797 (1983), art. 51, para. 1 (Switz.). 
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Secretary authorized by the Pensions Act of 2004 to raise the employee 
proportion to one-half.337  The California Government Code provides for 
co-determination for CalPERS; the chairperson and the vice-chairperson 
represent the interests of the beneficiaries.338  In Germany, however, 
there is no mandatory board participation by beneficiaries or 
occupational pensioners in support funds, retirement funds, pension 
funds, or direct insurance offered by insurance companies.339  Following 
the introduction of quasi-parity co-determination under the Co-
Determination Act 1976 (Mitbestimungsgesetz (MitbestG) 1976), the 
book reserves intended to cover pension obligations often exceeded the 
equity capital.340  With the increase of external funding of occupational 
pensions, mostly by Dax-30 companies, the employee representatives of 
the supervisory board can no longer be considered representatives of a 
“different form of capital.”341 
Other European countries implemented up to one-third parity co-
determination at the board level.342  Though it has co-determined boards 
in principle, the Netherlands has the highest ratio of independent board 
members in Europe.343  The Dutch Corporate Governance Code provides 
that all but one member of the supervisory board shall be independent.344  
Company employees and union officials involved in collective 
bargaining are excluded from representing employees on the supervisory 
board, unlike in Germany.345 However, international holding companies 
                                                                                                                 
 337. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 243(1) (Eng.). 
 338. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20090 (West 2012).  Currently, Rob Feckner serves as 
Board president, representative of the school members, and George Diehr serves as 
Board vice president, representative of the state members. Press Release, CalPERS, 
CalPERS Board Re-Elects Feckner as President; Diehr as Vice President (Jan. 14, 
2003), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2013/ 
jan/board-reelects.xml. 
 339. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 209–14, 327–30. 
 340. Ernst Steindorff, Einzelfragen zur Reichweite des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes, 
1977 ZHR 457, 464 (Ger.). 
 341. See Kübler, supra note 8, at 108 (original source); see also ROTH, PRIVATE 
ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 209–10. 
 342. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 71–72 (2010). 
 343. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42, 45. 
 344. DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, art. III.2.1 (2008). 
 345. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [DUTCH CIVIL CODE], art. 2:270 (Neth.). 
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are co-determination-free; companies may implement co-determination 
at the highest national level.346 
The Australian approach347 of not counting employee 
representatives is in line with national custom, and it appears to be more 
suitable than the ISS approach.  There would be some pressure on 
Germany to call for more co-determination if the majority of 
shareholder representatives were independent, but none of the employee 
representatives fit the description.  Becoming a European company may 
create some diversity on the employee side, but that is not a real option 
if all the employees are working in Germany.  If representatives of the 
controlling shareholder are treated as independent, employee 
representatives must be treated as independent as well. 
2. Establishing Two-Tier Boards or Co-Determination in the US? 
Even if co-determination was supported by some US economists348 
and viewed more favorably after the way the financial crisis was 
handled in Germany, the spread of co-determination in the US hardly 
seems realistic.  This is true even when taking into account co-
determination in state pension funds and looking at independent 
directors as a substitute for labor representatives on the board of 
CalPERS, for example.  The introduction of a two-tiered structure might 
be a better bet, even if it does not seem feasible today or in the near 
future.  Such structures might arguably exist in the NYSE.349  From a 
comparative perspective, the system in which all directors other than the 
CEO are independent resembles a two-tiered structure.  Such a 
functional view is even more appealing if one takes into account the fact 
that management boards in German companies usually attend entire 
supervisory board meetings.  Recomposing and transforming boards into 
                                                                                                                 
 346. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42, 45 (explaining the high 
ratio of independent directors). 
 347. AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), INTERNATIONAL VOTING 
ALERT GUIDELINES 15 (2010). 
 348. See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance 
Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. 
FIN. ECON. 673 (2006) (discussing the criticalness of only quasi-parity co-
determination); for a view critical towards quasi-parity co-determination, see Gary 
Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German 
Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 (2004). 
 349. Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2541, 2614 (2006) (on reporting to the independent directors). 
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a two-tier system might be a practical option if US Corporate 
Governance standards of independence are raised and significant 
shareholders and founders are considered dependent.  If it still happens 
that more than two-thirds of the board consists of independent directors, 
it would be a practical choice to separate executives and non-executives 
onto different boards.  In Europe, choosing between one-tier and two-
tier boards is now becoming the norm;350 following the Habersack 
Report,351 the German Jurists Forum is now recommending that same 
choice for German stock corporations.352 
III. BALANCING DIRECTOR PRIMACY AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
A. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS 
1. Shareholder Empowerment in the US 
The Dodd-Frank Act introduced European standards of shareholder 
rights to the United States.353  Since then, it has been possible for 
shareholders to nominate directors and to call for the separation of the 
Chairman of the Board and CEO roles; these have been two basic 
features of German company law since the 1861 enactment of the 
Commercial Code (which was codified in 1884).354  According to its 
                                                                                                                 
 350. Hopt, supra note 210, at 23. 
 351. HABERSACK, supra note 88, at 70–71, 103. 
 352. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section, 
Resolution 19 (adopted by vote of 53 in favor, 26 against, and 5 abstentions) (the 
legislator should allow all stock corporations, as is the case already for European 
Companies (SE), to choose between the two-tier and the one-tier board). 
 353. See Cools, supra note 16, at 742–43, 745–47; Bebchuk, The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 15, at 847. 
 354. The Commercial Code of 1861 [Allgemeines Deutches Handelsgesetzbuch 
(ADHGB)] transformed the ‘conseil de surveillance’ of the French Act on partnerships, 
limiting it to shares of the stock corporation itself. INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., US 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009), available 
athttp://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_ 
report.pdf.  See Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, supra note 316, 
at 376–77.  The reform in 1884 introduced a new Article 225a which foresaw personal 
incompatibility of management and supervisory board. See also Entwurf eines Gesetzes, 
betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften vom 7. 
März 1884 (Aktenstück Nr. 21). Teil 2, in HUNDERT JAHRE MODERNES AKTIENRECHT 
447, 461 (Werner Schubert & Peter Hommelhoff eds., 1985) (notes on the 
governmental draft). 
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policy statement, CII campaigned for the central corporate governance 
components of the Dodd-Frank Act, which were, inter alia, introduced 
by Senator Schumer and Maria Cantwell as the “Shareholder Bill of 
Rights.”355  In its policy statement, CII explicitly referred to European 
standards,356 stating that “[i]n the United States, unlike most of Europe, 
the only way that shareholders can run their own candidates is by 
waging a full-blown election contest, printing and mailing their own 
proxy cards to shareholders.  For most investors, this process would be 
onerous and prohibitively expensive.”357 
One noticeable omission within US company law is the absence of 
federal company law.  It is disputed whether the competition between 
the states for corporate business produced a race to the top or a race to 
the bottom.  Either way, Delaware, as the long-time champion of that 
competition, is not only responive to business in its state policies—for 
example, granting corporations the opportunity to exculpate directors for 
breaches of the duty of care after Smith v. Van Gorkom358—but also has 
well-equipped, professional, and specialized courts (e.g., the Court of 
Chancery) for company proceedings.359  The practice of excluding 
shareholders from management decisions was developed in the early 
20th century and served as a blueprint for German legislation some 75 
years ago, with German financial institutions providing the initiative.360  
In contrast, institutional investors in the United States campaigned in the 
opposite direction, namely to raise shareholder rights. 
2. Stewardship Codes 
The corporate governance responsibilities of institutional investors 
are currently being debated.  As a result of the recent financial and 
                                                                                                                 
 355. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009).  See also 
Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell Announce ‘Shareholder 
Bill of Rights’ to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate America (May 19, 
2009), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm? 
id=313468. 
 356. INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., US FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE 
INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_ 
advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_report.pdf. 
 357. For a German view, see Alexander Hellgardt & Andreas Hoger, 
Transatlantische Konvergenz der Aktionärsrechte, 2011 ZGR 38. 
 358. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 359. For the German perspective, see JAN VON HEIN, DIE REZEPTION US-
AMERIKANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND 479–83 (2008). 
 360. See infra Part III.B. 
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economic crisis, institutional investors have been criticized for not 
exercising sufficient control over companies,361 though many European 
companies already have a corporate governance or voting policy.362  It 
was against this backdrop in November of 2009 that the British 
Institutional Shareholders Committee presented a Code on the 
responsibility of institutional investors.363  Dealing with the same issue, 
the Stewardship Code was passed a few months earlier in July of 2009 
by the British Financial Reporting Council;364 the latter also revised the 
Combined Code and subsequently published it as the UK Corporate 
Governance Code.365  The increasing emphasis on the importance of 
shareholders in corporate governance, as well as their glaring failure 
before and during the financial crisis, suggests that it may obtain 
significant importance.366  The European Commission Green Paper also 
addresses the issue,367 and similar initiatives can be found in France368 
and the Netherlands.369 
                                                                                                                 
 361. See, e.g., DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK 
BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS  5.10–
5.12 (2009) [hereinafter WALKER REVIEW]. 
 362. RISKMETRICS, STUDY ON MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE MEMBER STATES 159 (2009).  A majority of the 
companies that were questioned welcomed a duty to report on their Corporate 
Governance policy. Id. at 164 
 363. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDERS COMM. (ISC), CODE ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2009). 
 364. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/ 
getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-Code-
September-2012.aspx. 
 365. See infra Part IV. 
 366. For a contrary view, see Holger Fleischer, Zukunftsfragen der Corporate 
Governance in Deutschland und Europa, 2011 ZGR 155, 164–65 (questioning the 
merits of having the Code function as a role model). 
 367. Green Paper, supra note 24, at 11 (stating that there is a lack of appropriate 
shareholder engagement), 13 (asset managers as active stewards of the investee 
companies). 
 368. LE CLUB DES JURISTES, COMMISSION RECOMMANDATIONS ET BONNES 
PRACTIQUES À L’ATTENTION DES ÉMETTEURS ET DES INVETISSEURS INSTITUTIONELS 
(2010). 
 369. EUMEDION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM, BEST PRACTICES FOR ENGAGED 
SHARE-OWNERSHIP INTENDED FOR EUMEDION PARTICIPANTS 1 (2011). 
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B. THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IN THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION 
ACT 1937 
If one were to count reinsurance companies as private pension 
institutions, or examine the traditional close ties between Munich Re 
(previously Münchener Rück) and Allianz, then even in Germany, 
private pension institutions have played a significant role in promoting 
corporate governance.370  The Stock Corporation Act (Aktienrecht) of 
1937, which laid the foundation for the still applicable organizational 
structure (Organisationsverfassung) of the German Stock Corporation, 
is based largely on the ideas of various figures in the financial industry 
such as Wilhelm Kißkalt, CEO of Münchener Rück at that time.371   In 
1934, in a report by Kißkalt for the Commission on Stock Corporation 
Law published in the Journal of the Academy for German Law,372 
Kißkalt anticipated the stock corporation’s organizational structure and 
forewarned of the board of directors’ duty to take into account the 
interests of employees as well as that of the common good 
(Allgemeinwohl).373  He further suggested keeping the supervisory board 
as small as possible, with seven supervisory board members.374  
Johannes C.D. Zahn’s Wirtschaftsführertum und Vertragsethik im neuen 
Aktienrecht (Leadership and Ethics in the New Stock Corporation 
Law),375 which he wrote during his time as legal advisor for the 
association of private banks (Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und 
Bankgewerbes), also had an impact on the drafting of the Stock 
Corporations Act.376  During the drafting of the new Stock Corporation 
                                                                                                                 
 370. See Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks, 10 EBOR 411, 424–25 
(2009) (discussing corporate governance for banks). 
 371. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, GEMEINWOHLFORMELN IM NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN 
RECHT 152 (1974) (testifying to Kißkalt’s strong influence in the Academy for German 
Law). 
 372. For the discussion, see 1 AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, 1933–1945: 
PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE/AUSSCHUß FÜR AKTIENRECHT, PROTOCOLS (Werner 
Schubert ed., 1986). 
 373. WILHELM KIßKALT, REFORM DES AKTIENRECHTS, in 1 ZEITSCHRIFT DER 
AKADMEIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT [ZAkDR] 20 (1934). 
 374. Wilhelm Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, in 1933-
1945: PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE/AUSSCHUß FÜR AKTIENRECHT 68 (1986); FRANZ 
SCHLEGELBERGER, DIE ERNEUERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 26 (1935) 
(pleading for 7-9 supervisory board members). 
 375. JOHANNES C. D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM 
NEUEN AKTIENRECHT (1934). 
 376. See KIßKALT, supra note 373, at 20. 
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Act, Zahn became general manager of the association of private banks; 
he later became CEO of the Bank Trinkhaus, now known as HSBC 
Trinkhaus.377  Finally, the financial industry’s influence on the current 
organizational structure of the German Stock Corporation was 
completed by the Minister of Trade and Industry at the time, Kurt 
Schmitt, whom Kißkalt had earlier appointed to the Allianz board.378 
Keeping with the tradition of stock corporation law reform that 
took place during the Weimar Republic,379 the organizational structure 
of the reform was developed comparatively:380  In his monograph to US 
law, which was well-founded at the time, Zahn referred to the status of 
the general meeting of shareholders. 381  It also seems reasonable to 
presume Kißkalt’s proximity to the United States, seeing that he joined 
the board after the ‘Catastrophe of San Francisco’ (Katastrophe von San 
Fransisco), a disastrous 1906 earthquake that caused a series of fires and 
destroyed much of the city.382  This explanatory pattern with regard to 
the supervisory board—which is of particular interest here—does appear 
to be complex, particularly given that in the United States the 
construction of the supervisory board as a board of directors was sought 
to be halted in Germany.383  The founding of the supervisory board 
through the Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches 
Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB)) of 1861384 marked a major legal 
                                                                                                                 
 377. Johannes Zahn, MUNZINGER ARCHIVE, http://www.munzinger.de/search/ 
document?index=mol00&id=00000005034&type=text/html&query.key=aY7y5d6Y&te
mplate=/publikationen/personen/document.jsp&preview=. 
 378. See GERALD D. FELDMAN, DIE ALLIANZ ÜND DIE DEUTSCHE 
VERSICHERUNGSWIRTSCHAFT 1933-1945 (2001). 
 379. See, e.g., WALTER HALLSTEIN, DIE AKTIENRECHTE DER GEGENWART: GESETZE 
ÜND ENTWÜRFE IN RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (1931). 
 380. Markus Roth, Besondere Regeln für geschlossene und börsennotierte 
Gesellschaften: Überlegungen aus Anlass des 67. Deutschen Juristentages 2008, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70: UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND 
VERANTWORTUNG 1261, 1268–69 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2010). 
 381. See ZAHN, supra note 375, at 95; see also Lamb v. Lehmann, 143 N.E. 276, 
278 (Ohio 1924); Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918). 
 382. See Biography of Wilhelm Kißkalt, in AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, supra 
note 372, at LVI. 
 383. See Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, supra note 
374, at 47; see also ZAHN, supra note 375, at 202 (though he does not mention the 
independence of the management board from the supervisory board). 
 384. See JAN LIEDER, DER AUFSICHTSRAT IM WANDEL DER ZEIT (2006) (providing a 
historical overview); MARCUS LUTTER, Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit - von 
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innovation, though at that point in time setting up the supervisory board 
was still optional.385  Until then, control of German Stock Corporations 
was still largely, but by no means exclusively, held by the board of 
directors.386  With the lapse of government supervision and the transition 
to the formation of stock corporations simply by fulfilling the legal 
requirements of the Commercial Code, the supervisory board became a 
compulsory company organ.387  The board of directors was maintained 
in corporate practice, as expressly authorized by the Commercial Code 
of 1884.388  Under Article 225 (3) of the Commercial Code of 1884, 
further tasks could be given to the supervisory board, since it was 
devised in practice as a de facto board of directors.389  In 1933, a later 
editor of a monograph on the Stock Corporation Act of 1937, Friedrich 
Klausing, resisted a reversal of the de facto board of directors into a 
supervisory organ in the true sense; he later published the Stock 
Corporation Act of 1937, including an official explanatory report, in 
which he commented elaborately on the leadership principle,390 though 
still with a fair degree of skepticism.391 
                                                                                                                 
seinen Anfängen bis heute, in 2 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 389–91 (Walter Bayer & 
Mathias Habersack eds., 2007). 
 385. Klaus J. Hopt, Zur Funktion des Aufsichtsrats im Verhältnis von Industrie und 
Bankensystem, in RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG DER GROßUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND 
FRÜHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT 227, 231–32 (Norbert Horn & Jürgen Kocka eds., 1979). 
 386. Klaus J. Hopt, Ideelle und wirtschaftliche Grundlagen der Aktien-, Bank- und 
Börsenrechtsentwicklung im 19. Jahrhundert, in 5 WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION 
DES PRIVATRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT: GELD UND BANKEN 128, 152–54 (Helmut 
Coing & Walter Wilhelm eds., 1980). 
 387. See Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die 
Aktiengesellschaften, June 11, 1870, Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen bundes 
[Federal Gazette of the North German Confederation], at 375, 378 (1870) (Ger.). 
 388. See Explanatory memorandum of the Commercial Code of 1884, reprinted in 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die 
Aktiengesellschaften vom 7. März 1884 (Aktenstück Nr. 21). Teil 2, supra note 354, at 
387, 447, 461. 
 389. See HERRMANN STAUB & ALBERT PINNER, 2 STAUB’S KOMMENTAR ZUM 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH § 246, Anm. 10 (14th ed. 1932) (discussing the relevant 
implications); RICHARD PASSOW, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 397–98 (2d ed. 1922). See 
also Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 95 and § 111, in AKTIENGESETZ: 
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, nos. 4–9, 563–68 (respectively). 
 390. See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, GESETZ ÜBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND 
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN AUF AKTIEN (AKTIENGESETZ) NEBST 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND “AMTLICHER BEGRÜNDUNG” 59–61 (1937) (on the leadership 
principle). 
 391. See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, REFORM DES AKTIENRECHTS 249 (1933). 
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An important new aspect of the organizational structure included in 
the Stock Corporation Act of 1937 was the exclusion of the general 
meeting of management.392  This made it possible to portray the 
management as ‘Führer,’ thereby raising the level of approval of the 
stock corporation as a legal form in the Third Reich, which was 
necessary because of the danger of falling out of favor at the beginning 
of the that period.393  Kißkalt justified his proposal with the missing 
practical significance of the general meeting’s status, by saying that he 
did not know of any cases in which the general meeting encroached on 
the management of the company.394  At the decisive second meeting, 
Kißkalt explicitly called on “gentlemen of the younger generation” to 
come up with new ideas and thoughts.395  These included Cornelius 
Freiherr Heyl zu Herrnhausen, who demanded the abolition of the 
supervisory board;396 Hans Würdinger, who proposed a distinction 
between management shareholders (Verwaltungsaktionäre) and bearer 
shareholders, with only the former having a voting right;397 and Werner 
Bachmann, who wanted the management board to be appointed by the 
supervisory board only and then confirmed by a government agency.398  
The last speaker at the meeting was Zahn, whose proposals regarding 
the disempowerment of the general meeting and more subordinately, the 
limiting of the supervisory board’s powers eventually found their way, 
to a large extent, into the Stock Corporation Act of 1937.399  It can be 
assumed that Zahn’s proposals represented the ideas of the banks, which 
in the 1920s and the 1930s held the majority of the supervisory board 
seats.400 
                                                                                                                 
 392. Stock Corporation Act, Jan. 30, 1937, RGBL. I at 107, § 95 (5) 1 (Ger.). 
 393. Roth, Besondere Regeln für geschlossene und börsennotierte Gesellschaften, 
Überlegungen aus Anlass des 67. Deutschen Juristentags 2008, supra note 374, at 
1261, 1268, 1274 (explaining the reduction in the number of stock corporations as a 
result of of the introduction of the minimum capital regime). 
 394. See Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, supra note 
374, at 47–48 (noting that none of the people present were aware of such cases). 
 395. See id. at 20. 
 396. See id. at 21–23. 
 397. See id. at 26–28. 
 398. See id. at 36–37. 
 399. See id. at 60–65; see also ZAHN, supra note 375. 
 400. See Karoline Krenn, Von der “Macht der Banken” zur Leitidee des deutschen 
Produktionsregimes Bank-Industrie Verflechtung am Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, 53 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENSGESCHICHTE [ZUG] 70 (2008) (for a more detailed 
account); see also Karoline Krenn, ALLE MACHT DEN BANKEN? ZUR STRUKTUR 
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C. PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING ENLIGHTENED DIRECTOR PRIMACY 
1. Shareholders Directly Contacting Independent Directors 
Stewardship Codes are associated with institutional shareholders 
seeking contact with independent directors.401  The relevant pension 
associations in the United States and Australia, where no such Codes 
exist, stress that institutional investors should have access to the 
independent board members.402  Though such contact is rarely discussed 
in Germany,403 it is also possible under German law. 
2. Director Accountability and Adequate Compensation 
Some of the principles that were strengthened in order to balance 
the introduction of director primacy in the German Stock Corporation 
Act of 1937 were director liability,404 adequate director compensation,405 
and annual discharge of liability406 for all board members (management 
and supervisory boards).  The latter does not lead to exemption from 
liability, but rather is a mandatory signal of trust at every annual general 
meeting.  These principles are also relevant for long-termism, and 
                                                                                                                 
PERSONALER NETZWERKE DEUTSCHER UNTERNEHMEN AM BEGINN DES 20. 
JAHRHUNDERTS (2012). 
 401. See UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, Guidance to Principle 4 (suggesting that 
institutional investors consider contacting independent directors when they have 
concerns); see also id., Guidance to Principle 3 (advising institutional investors to meet 
with the chairman and, where appropriate, with other board members, to ensure that 
independent directors provide adequate oversight). 
 402. See AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), A GUIDE FOR 
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES TO MONITOR LISTED AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES (ACSI 
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES) § 18(c) (2011) (“The board should respond, where 
practicable, to communications from shareholders.  In particular, shareholders should 
have access to non-executive directors.”). 
403.  In the UK, such contacts (especially of the senior independent director) signal 
good corporate governance. See UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § E.1.1 (2012), 
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx. 
 404. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 405. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 406. See Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, supra note 316, at 
368–69. 
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therefore will hopefully contribute to the international discussion in a 
more sustainable manner than capital requirements.407 
IV. LONG-TERMISM 
A. LONG-TERMISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION 
1. Long-Termism in the European Commission Green Paper on 
Corporate Governance 
The Green Paper on corporate governance dicusses the 
inconsistency between the increasing importance of private pension 
institutions and the short-termism of capital markets generally.408  
Although private pension institutions have long-term obligations to their 
beneficiaries and their participation in capital markets has risen 
(according to the European Commission), the investment horizons in the 
last 20 years have decreased; due to a turnover of 150% of market 
capitalization, the average investment period is set to be eight months.409  
The Walker Review already identified this inconsistency.410  The 
European Commission is remarkably frank in inquiring about rules that 
counteract the long-term interests of institutional investors,411 and taking 
into account the relationship between private pension institutions and 
their asset managers.412 
At present, there are no concrete measures in sight that would 
promote long-term investment by long-term-oriented investors.413  In 
                                                                                                                 
 407. See Fleischer, supra note 366, at 155, 169 (hoping for a transformation in 
German law); see also MARCUS LUTTER, KAPITAL, SICHERUNG DER 
KAPITALAUFBRINGUNG UND KAPITALERHALTUNG IN DEN AKTIEN- UND GMBH-RECHTEN 
DER EWG (1964); Marcus Lutter, Legal Capital in Europe, 1 ECFR, Special Volume 
(2006). 
 408. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 3 (presenting this as the second and most 
detailed point of its “three subjects which are at the heart of good corporate 
governance”).  The other two points deal with the board of directors and the duty to 
comply or explain. See id. 
 409. See id. at 12. 
 410. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 26–27. 
 411. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 12. 
 412. See id. at 12–13. 
 413. See Green Paper Long-Term Financing of the European Economy, at 15, COM 
(2013) 150 final (Mar. 25, 2013) (“Ideas have also been advanced to encourage greater 
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France, shareholders that have held their shares for longer than two 
years obtain a double vote.414  The Reflection Group recommended that 
the articles of incorporation mandate that a higher dividend be given to 
shareholders committed to long-term investments.415  This is to be 
understood as a reaction to the change in ownership structure and the 
dominance of portfolio investors.  So far, long-term investors have only 
had an incentive to monitor the management of their shares if their 
holdings were large enough to intervene directly in the management of 
the company.416  With dispersed ownership, by contrast, it is in the 
short-term interest of institutional investors and their ‘principals’ (the 
beneficiaries) to sell their holdings swiftly,417 as the costs of control 
typically exceed the uncertain reward. 
An additional dividend for shareholders committed to long-term 
investments appears to be possible in Germany under the prevailing law.  
It should be recognized that companies with dispersed ownership have 
an interest in long-term, stable structures, and in appropriate 
circumstances, a proportional encroachment on the rights of short-term 
shareholders may be acceptable.418  Seen from the perspective of 
minority shareholder protection, it is questionable whether owner-
managers, which are very important in Germany,419 should be entitled to 
a special dividend, in addition to being given a control premium for 
share sales.420  Alternative mechanisms to promote the control of 
management by institutional investors could be the establishment of 
                                                                                                                 
long-term shareholder engagement . . . such as . . . granting increased voting rights or 
dividends to long-term shareholders.”). 
 414. Code De Commerce [C. COM] art. L225-123 (Fr.) (stating that adouble voting 
right can be provided for in the articles of association or in an extraordinary general 
meeting). 
 415. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTERNAL MKTS. AND SERVS., REPORT OF THE 
REFLECTION GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF EU COMPANY LAW 47 (2011). 
 416. See STEFAN PRIGGE, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 945, 974 tbl. 9 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (on the ownership structure at 
the end of the 20th Century). 
 417. For a principles-based account, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970). 
 418. On the requirements, see, for example, UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG]: 
KOMMENTAR § 53a, comment 10 (9th ed. 2010). 
 419. Some examples of family-owned companies in the DAX are Beiersdorf, BMW, 
and Metro. 
 420. See Fleischer, supra note 366, at 166–67. 
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special committees of long-term investors, for example,421 or the 
establishment of such committees on the supervisory board.  In 
Deutschland AG, the bank representatives on the supervisory boards 
fulfilled a similar role.422 
European reforms will probably focus on investor and financial 
reporting rules for long-term investors and their relationships with asset 
managers.  In Germany, the laws on investments and deposits for life 
insurance companies make it essentially impossible for them to invest in 
comapny shares.423  In light of rising government debt, the risk of 
investments in shares, including occupational pensions, will have to be 
reconsidered.424  Asset managers’ remuneration of private pension 
institutions should be done on a long-term basis.425 
The OECD installed a working group to focus on the issue of 
longer-term investments and published its first policy paper.426  
Globally, it is a challenge for the pension fund industry to bring its 
contracts with asset managers in line with its long-term obligations via 
its clients.   Ensuring that hedge funds do not bet against the rest of the 
portfolio of the pension fund, thereby causing perhaps even more long-
term harms by achieving short-term gains, seems difficult, if not 
impossible to achieve. 
2. Changing Pension Design? 
Enhancing long-termism in occupational pensions is not an easy 
task, especially since it is difficult to implement long-term investing.  
Matching pension obligations with long-term debt ignores the 
                                                                                                                 
 421. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 26–27, 72–75 (considering the 
introduction of institutional shareholder committees). 
 422. See PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A 
REVIEW (MYNERS REPORT) 1–2 (2001) (likening a “strong funded pension system” to a 
“key national asset”). 
 423. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 298–300. 
 424. See Markus Roth, Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 15.07.2010 – C-271/08, 
Ausschreibung von Betriebsrentenzusagen, 2011 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
ARBEITSRECHT [EUZA] 213, 218. 
 425. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159 (Apr. 30, 2009) (recommending alignment of a 
remuneration policy with a long-term business plan). 
 426. Raffaele Della Croce, Fiona Stewart & Juan Yermo, Promoting Longer-Term 
Investment by Institutional Investors: Selected Issues and Policies, 2011 OECD J. FIN. 
MKT. TRENDS 1. 
2013] PENSION CAPITALISM 811 
insolvency risk of firms and states.  It is necessary to develop and 
practice an overall investment strategy.  Short investment horizons are 
not per se unsustainable, and an effort should be made to avoid 
imperfect portfolios with different asset managers in danger of betting 
against each other. 
In an ideal occupational pension plan design, automatic enrollment 
should be strengthened.427  In the United Kingdom, automatic 
enrollment was introduced by the Pension Act of 2008, leading to higher 
pension contributions of both employers and employees; with some state 
aid the total came to about 8% of employee earnings.428  The concept of 
automatic enrollment was also endorsed by the German Jurists Forum in 
2004429 and in 2011 by the AbA, the German association on Occupation 
Pensions.430  In the United States, many studies reflect favorably on 
automatic enrollment by showing improvements in participation rates 
and contributions.431  A recent study also showed that large plans with 
automatic enrollment have significantly fewer costs than large plans 
without it, or small plans.432 
With the general trend of the elderly working longer, occupational 
pensions seem to be acceptable even without guaranteeing a specific 
pension age.  Pension age is rising in Germany, making lifetime 
working accounts that can be transferred into pension rights at will more 
attractive.433  Such multi-channeling might also provide the opportunity 
for saving via occupational pensions with the option for earlier 
retirement.  Occupational pensions should also be accessible before 
                                                                                                                 
 427. See OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 124, at 125; ROTH, PRIVATE 
ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 661–62. 
 428. Pensions Act, 2008, c. 30, § 20 (Eng.). 
 429. 65. DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG, BONN 2004: BESCHLÜSSE [65TH GERMAN 
JURISTS FORUM, BONN 2004: DECISIONS], Private Pensions (2004) [hereinafter GERMAN 
JURISTS FORUM, BONN 2004]. 
 430. ABA – ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT FÜR BETRIEBLICHE ALTERSVERSORUNG E.V., 
DIALOG PRO BETRIEBSRENTE: MEMORANDUM FÜR EINE NEUJUSTIERUNG DER 
ALTERSVERSORGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 15–16, 3.3 (2011) (opting out). 
 431. See Akerlof, supra note 149, at 424; see also Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. 
Thaler, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee 
Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164 (2004), RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 432. DELOITTE, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN 
FEES: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE (2011). 
 433. See ANNEKATRIN VEIT, ARBEITSZEITKONTEN UND BETRIEBLICHE 
ALTERSVERSORGUNG (2008). 
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normal retirement age.434  Generally, the confidence in guarantees435 has 
deteriorated due to the financial crisis and the ongoing accumulation of 
state debts following it, leading to a state debt crisis. 
B. GERMAN LONG-TERMISM COMPANY LAW PRINCIPLES 
1. Adequate Management Compensation 
Another politically relevant issue, management remuneration,436 
has now taken on a longer-term focus worldwide.437  In the background 
of this issue is the multilevel principal/agent problem; the dualistic 
board structure in Germany makes this problem particularly pertinent.  
Asset managers are agents of the pensioners and supervisory directors 
are agents of the shareholders, and essentially the asset managers.  
Management board members are agents of the supervisory directors.  
The existing rules on management remuneration, and the liability they 
imposed, were already reformed in Germany before the end of the 
financial crisis.438  Under the provisions of the VorstAG,439 the 
remuneration of management board members of listed companies must 
be based on sustainable company development (§ 87 (1) German Stock 
Corporation Act).440 
                                                                                                                 
 434. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, at 608 (the minimum age for 
occupational pensions in Germany is 60). 
 435. See id. at 193–242 (2009). 
 436. See Klaus J. Hopt, Reformprobleme im Handels-, Gesellschafts- und 
Abschlussprüferrecht, in KOMPATIBILITÄT DES TÜRKISCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS 21, 34 (Yesim M. Atamer & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2009); see also 
Christoph Engel, Das schwindende Vertrauen in die Marktwirtschaft und die Folgen für 
das Recht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70, supra note 380, at 2733, 2743–
45. 
 437. See Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive 
Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10 J. CORP. L. 
STUDIES [JCLS] 73 (2010) (explaining the executive remuneration in Europe). 
 438. Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorStAG) [Adequate 
Management Remuneration Act], July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509; see Klaus-Stefan 
Hohenstatt, Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung, 30 ZIP 1349 
(2009); Eberhard Vetter, Begrenzung der Vorstandsbezüge durch 
Hauptversammlungsbeschluss?, 30 ZIP 1307 (2009). 
 439. Adequate Management Remuneration Act, July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509. 
 440. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159, at 59–60 (Apr. 30, 2009). 
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Internationally, there was a clear market failure with respect to the 
calculation of executive salaries.441  As a solution to this, the United 
States endorsed the ‘say on pay’ model, based on the British one.442  As 
a result of a referendum in Switzerland, ‘say on pay’ will be integrated 
in the Swiss Constitution in the form of a mandatory vote at annual 
meetings.443  The US pension funds demanded a ‘say on pay’ for the 
United States at the time of enactment of recent financial market 
regulations.444  The remuneration practice of directors has been 
questioned by some within the United States for a while;445 however, the 
academic focus is currently on the remuneration practice of banks.446  
Financial service provider Hermes, as another example, now provides an 
opinion on executive salaries in Germany due to the increasing 
internationalization of share investments by Anglo-American pension 
funds.447  However, there are two corporate law issues which are yet to 
be resolved: first, whether the directors should be remunerated as 
entrepreneurs or as company employees,448 and secondly, the extent to 
which board members should be compensated by means of pension 
                                                                                                                 
 441. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 27. 
 442. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience 
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009). 
 443. Bundesverfassung [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 3, 2013, art. 95, para. 3 (Switz.).  
The Swiss regulation is heavily discussed in Germany and may lead to further changes 
of the German Stock Corporation Act. The Adequate Management Remuneration Act 
in 2009, supra note 439, also introduced a say-on-pay regulation. Resolutions of the 
general meeting concerning the system on remuneration of managing directors are 
possible, but not binding. See Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 
120 (4), last amended by Restructuring Act, Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.). 
 444. See INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., supra note 349, at 6; see also Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
 445. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE - THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004). 
 446. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247 (2010).  
 447. Sven Oliver Clausen, Aktionäre erzwingen Votum über Vorstandsgehälter, FIN. 
TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (Ger.), Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.ftd.de/finanzen/ 
maerkte/:druck-von-hermes-aktionaere-erzwingen-votum-ueber-
vorstandsgehaelter/50014388.html. 
 448. Peter O. Mülbert, Shareholder Value aus rechtlicher Sicht, 1997 ZGR 129, 147 
(favoring a shareholder value approach); see also Peter O. Mülbert, 
Marktwertmaximierung als Unternehmensziel der Aktiengesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR VOLKER RÖHRICHT ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG: GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
RECHNUNGSLEGUNG SPORTRECHT 421 (Georg Crezelius et al. eds., 2005). 
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claims (in which case the remuneration structure would be based on the 
sustainable growth of the company).449 
In listed companies, remuneration of management board members 
must be aligned with the long-term success of the company.450  The 
German Stock Corporation Act refers to ‘sustainability,’451 a phrase 
developed in 18th century German forest sciences and today widely used 
for environmental matters.  In this context, ‘sustainability’ means long-
termism as well as the careful handling of natural resources.452  Whether 
the compensation of German executives has to be taken into account, 
and what the environmental consequences of the business may be, has 
not yet been discussed.  The time needed for sustainable compensation 
might also be subject to judicial review.  The German Corporate 
Governance Code refers only to multi-year compensation elements.453  
Although the German Stock Corporation Act contains a similar 
provision,454 this specification might be too short.   Real long-termism in 
management compensation might go beyond the five-year period 
discussed today and may also deal with pension payments.455 
2. Annual Discharge of Managing and Supervisory Directors 
Annual discharge has been part of German practice since the early 
19th century, and has been mandatory since the incorporation of the 
leadership principle under the German Stock Corporation Act of 
1937.456  Since then, ‘discharge’ is no longer simply a discharge from 
liability, but a sign of confidence for managing and supervisory 
directors.  The company may not waive liability claims in the first three 
                                                                                                                 
 449. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.2.2, § 4.2.3, § 4.2.5, model 
tbl. 1 (2013). The 2013 amendment focused on management remuneration and on 
pensions: levels and disclosures. To base variable compensation components on a 
multi-year assessment (per the terms of § 4.2.3 of the German Corporate Governance 
Code) will be insufficient to achieve sustainability. 
 450. Stock Corporation Act, § 87. 
 451. Id. § 87(1). 
 452. Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, Nachhaltigkeit als Zielvorgabe für die 
Vorstandsvergütung, 2010 GESELLSCHAFTS-UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [GWR] 515. 
 453. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.2.3 (2) 3. 
 454. Stock Corporation Act § 87 (1) 3. 
 455. Markus Roth, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2012, 66 WERTPAPIER-
MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1985 (2012). 
 456. Stock Corporation Act, § 70. 
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years after director wrongdoings.457  In light of the financial crisis, the 
limitation period for director liability was extended to ten years for 
listed companies.458  Loss of such confidence is cause for the 
supervisory board to remove management directors; international 
scholars therefore assume ad nutum that removal is possible for 
managing directors.459 
Discharge and votes of confidence should be considered standard-
setters in corporate governance.  Annual re-elections of directors, as 
advocated by institutional investors internationally, might prove to be 
counterproductive when implementing long-termism in company law.  
At least at first glance, it seems counterintuitive to expect a director to 
seek re-election every year if corporate governance is directed to 
promote the long-term success of the company. 460  Nevertheless, such 
assumptions should not lead to the insulation of managers from 
shareholders.461  Annual discharge of directors might even be 
accompanied by mandatory annual votes at the general meeting on the 
remuneration system and the maximum remuneration for managing 
directors. 
3. Deductibles in D&O Insurance 
The introduction of director primacy in the German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1937 was balanced by tightening liability 
standards.462  If the premiums for D&O insurance are paid by the 
                                                                                                                 
 457. Id. § 93 (4) 3. 
 458. Theodor Baums, Managerhaftung und Verjährung, 174 ZHR 593 (2010) 
(Ger.). 
 459. Sofie Cools, Europe’s Ius Commune on Director Revocability, 8 ECFR 199 
(2011). 
 460. Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court promotes longer-term board 
elections (such as for five years) instead of annual re-election. See Jack B. Jacobs, 
“Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1645, 1657 (2011). 
 461. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 462. See supra Part III.C.2.  For material standards of review, see Roth, Outside 
Director Liability, supra note 35, at 346–50, 354–69; for procedural requirements see 
Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, §§ 147–48, last amended by 
Restructuring Act, Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900 (Ger.).  See also Habersack’s proposal 
in the Habersack Report that every shareholder should be allowed to sue managing and 
supervisory directors. HABERSACK, supra note 88, at 91–96 (2012).  The proposal was 
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company, the German Stock Corporation Act now mandatorily provides 
a suitable deductible (though this idea was only a recommendation in 
the German Corporate Governance Code).463  The Adequate 
Management Remuneration Act amended the German Stock 
Corporation Act in 2009.464  Now if a company takes out a D&O 
insurance policy for the management board, a deductible of at least 10% 
of the loss, consisting of up to 1.5 times the fixed annual compensation 
of the management board member, must be agreed upon.465  The 
German Corporate Governance Code recommends that a similar 
deductible be agreed upon in any D&O policy for the supervisory 
board.466 
The financial crisis showed that some sectors’ appetite for risk was 
too great.467  Regardless, it would be questionable to delete liability 
exposure in practice.468  If generous standards of judicial review are not 
met, personal liability leading to out-of-pocket payments must be an 
option.469  Whether there should be a deductible, and what the scope of a 
suitable deductible would be, can be worked out by referencing the 
settlements in the Enron and the WorldCom cases.470  It may be 
necessary to distinguish between violations of directors’ duties based on 
the level of severity; directors’ personal assets could be used in this 
calculation.471  It is useful to look at what other countries have done in 
such a situation.  In Japan, a cap for director liability is possible, but it 
has to amount to the earnings of six years for executives and two years 
                                                                                                                 
rejected by the German Jurists Forum. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra 
note 89, Business Law Section, Resolution 22. 
 463. Stock Corporation Act § 93(2)3. 
 464. Adequate Management Remuneration Act, July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509 
(Ger.). 
 465. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 3.8(2)(1). 
 466. Id. § 3.8(2)(2). 
 467. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 52. 
 468. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: 
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). 
 469. See Bernard Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1070–71, 1089–95 (2006) (discussing the absence of 
outside director liability in US company law cases after Smith v. Van Gorkom, until at 
least 2004). 
 470. See id. at 1057 (explaining that to settle the WorldCom case, twelve outside 
directors personally paid $24.75 million, and in the Enron case, ten outside directors 
paid $13 million for securities litigation and $1.5 million for ERISA claims). 
 471. See Roth, Outside Director Liability, supra note 35, at 371. 
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for non-executives.472  For minor errors in judgment, the range used by 
Germany, a quarter up to one year’s earning, might be appropriate.  For 
the transatlantic discussion concerning a suitable deductible, the amount 
of the Japanese cap should also be taken into account. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES (ESG), 
ESPECIALLY GREEN INVESTMENT 
CalPERS has plans to integrate environmental, social and 
governance issues (ESG) into their investment process; it published its 
first report in the spring of 2012.473  Generally, the long-term investment 
projections of private pension institutions suggest their support of 
sustainable investment policies.  Against this backdrop, it makes sense 
that insurance companies and pension funds have a strong interest in 
sustainable investments474 and that appropriate indices are being 
developed.  It should be noted that the United Nations examined the 
duties of asset managers with respect to their investments in 
comparative perspective.475  As part of a campaign by the insurance 
industry in the United Kingdom, ‘Climate Wise’ already represented 
60% of property insurers and 50% of life insurers in 2008;476 in 2009 
more than half of these incorporated a climate change analysis in their 
investment strategies.477  Climate Wise is supplemented by the Carbon 
Disclosure Project,478 an initiative strongly supported by British 
Telecom (the majority owner of Hermes pension fund); by the terms of 
the project, companies should set a goal of how much they plan to 
reduce their CO2 emissions.479  Before the climate conference in 
Copenhagen, institutional investors (who in total manage $13 trillion 
worth of assets) signed a declaration stating which industrial nations 
                                                                                                                 
 472. Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across 
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1460 (2006). 
 473. CALPERS, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY 
(2012), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-
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 474. See supra Part IV.A. 
 475. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), ASSET MGMT. WORKING GRP., FIDUCIARY 
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, 
SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT (2009). 
 476. CLIMATEWISE, ONE YEAR REVIEW 5 (2008) (U.K.). 
 477. CLIMATEWISE, SECOND YEAR REVIEW 31 (2009) (U.K.). 
 478. See also Puri, supra note 70, at 435. 
 479. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, THE CARBON CHASM 20 app. (2009) (providing 
an overview of company-specific commitments). 
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should reduce CO2 emissions by 80–95% by the year 2050.480  CalPERS 
focuses on the disclosure of climate risks481 and, as mentioned above, is 
in the midst of including climate change into its investment principles; 
its spring 2012 publication included its first portfolio-wide report on 
ESG.482 
Even the SEC has begun to take the consequences of climate 
change seriously,483 giving in to great pressure from large institutional 
investors and the US insurance supervisory authority.  At the beginning 
of 2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”) decided to demand that insurance companies with a premium 
volume of more than $500 million report the environmental risks that 
could affect them.484  The questions to be answered by the insurance 
companies relate mainly to the impact of climate change on their 
investment portfolios.485  The NAIC has incorporated risk-focused 
examination questions into the Financial Condition Examiners 
Handbook, which addresses the impact of climate change.486  In Europe, 
the European Commission launched a proposal to include a statement on 
                                                                                                                 
 480. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE ET AL., 2009 INVESTOR 
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environmental, social and employee matters in the annual report of 
larger firms.487 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Labor and pensions in the United States and Germany have 
significant differences.  While German labor and pension law is based 
on bans of unfair dismissals in labor contracts, employee representation 
on supervisory boards, and public pensions, the United States provides 
no such employee rights, yet occupational pension assets equal the US 
GDP or the pension assets of the other OECD member states.  Among 
the institutional investors who together own half of all equity of US-
listed firms, pension funds, particularly state pension funds, are most 
active in setting corporate governance standards and imposing those 
standards directly and via proxy advisors.  Some of the core principles 
already implemented involve independent directors, the balancing of 
director primacy with shareholder rights, long-termism (meaning the 
creation of long-term shareholder value), and consideration of ESG 
(especially green investments). 
A transatlantic view is constructive for the evaluation of these core 
corporate governance principles, which are central for pension 
capitalism.  The European Union and the United States apply different 
standards with respect to significant or majority shareholders.  While the 
EU recommendation—as proposed by the Corporate Governance 
Commission, and perhaps in the near future by the German Corporate 
Governance Code as well—provides that significant shareholders are 
excluded from qualifying as independent directors, such relationships 
are not mentioned in the United States.  This may be relevant since 
many US technology firms have founder-directors that are significant 
shareholders. 
The inclusion of US corporate law principles in the German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1937 needs to be mentioned with respect to the 
balancing of shareholder rights with director primacy.  Germany has 
maintained and tightened central shareholder rights, such as the right to 
nominate supervisory directors; it also introduced new ones, such as the 
annual discharge of supervisory and managing directors.  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                 
 487. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
amdending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards of non-
financial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, art. 1(1)(a), 
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director compensation was mandatorily restricted to adequacy, and 
director liability was sharpened (it played no de facto role until the 
1990s when US standards were discussed again).  Such principles are 
also relevant for long-termism, and should be sharpened and raised to 
the top of the institutional investors’ agenda.  Pioneering pension funds, 
such as CalPERS and the UK Hermes Pension Fund, as well as pension 
fund associations, such as the US CII and the Australian ACSI, should 
focus on long-term shareholder value and other social issues.  
